The sole shareholder of several closely held corporate entities engages in a fraudulent transfer by extinguishing one entity’s right to payment from a third party in exchange for the release of liabilities owed by other entities to that same third party. In Motorworld, Inc. v. William Benkendorf, et al., __ N.J. __ (Mar. 30, 2017), the New Jersey Supreme Court voided such a transfer against a Chapter 7 debtor corporation whose sole asset was a $600,000 loan receivable purportedly cancelled by the release.

After several years of drafting, debate, compromise and fine tuning, it appears that major changes to the administration of consumer bankruptcy cases are imminent. On April 27, 2017, Chief Justice John Roberts submitted to Congress amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure that will have a profound impact on consumer bankruptcy cases.

The Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated ruling in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. ___ (2017)1 on March 21, reversing the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ affirmance of an order approving the distribution of the proceeds of settlement of bankruptcy estate causes of action to general unsecured creditors via structured dismissal, with no distribution to holders of priority wage claims.

The Court framed the question presented, and its ruling, very narrowly—twice. First:

In a very recent decision, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York determined that a negative inference to an exception to a negative covenant prevented a company from undertaking a proposed restructuring transaction. We find the case unique not because of the result necessarily, but rather because the court used the negative inference to override another express provision in the Credit Agreement.

Although there has been much discussion of the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Marblegate, this article addresses a question other commentators have yet to tackle: namely, how the Second Circuit’s decision impacts the Trust Indenture Act’s protection of guarantee obligations included in an indenture. Below we provide our view on how Marblegate affects indenture guarantees. More specifically, we discuss how the decision is consistent with provisions of the TIA that expressly protect a noteholder’s payment rights under a guarantee.

Synopsis

On Dec. 7, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp, No. 15-659. (S. Ct. argued Dec.

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has clarified the type of injury that must be alleged by a plaintiff suing under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). This decision, in Church v. Accretive Health, Inc., is the first from the Eleventh Circuit applying the United States Supreme Court’s recent holding in Spokeo v. Robins.

Several of the Official Bankruptcy Forms will be replaced on December 1, 2015. For creditors, the most notable changes will be to two forms: the Proof of Claim form, Form 410, and the Mortgage Proof of Claim Attachment, Form 410A. These changes reflect an effort by the Bankruptcy Courts to elicit a clear and complete picture of what the debtor owes and how much must be paid to cure a pre-bankruptcy arrearage. Due to the Bankruptcy Court’s focus on clarity, creditors are well advised to closely follow the claim forms and accompanying instructions.

The Indiana Court of Appeals recently held that creditors must move for an in personam remedy in the original foreclosure judgment or forfeit their right to collect deficiency funds. In Elliott v. Dyck O’Neal, the bank foreclosed upon a borrower’s residence, and sought judgment against the borrowers for the full amount of the outstanding balance in the complaint. The motion for default judgment, and accompanying order, however, only sought an order in rem for the outstanding debt—omitting any mention of an in personam remedy.

On September 18, 2015, Margaret M. Okamoto (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint (the “Complaint”) in The United States District Court for the District of Nevada alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (the “FCRA”), against, inter alia, Bank of America, N.A. (“BOA”), Mutual of Omaha Bank (“MOB”), and Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”).  See Okamoto v. Bank of America et al., No. 2:15-cv-01800-GMN-GWF (Sept. 18, 2015).