In In re Short Bark Industries Inc., 17-11502 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017), Judge Kevin Gross of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware read the Supreme Court’s holding in Jevic narrowly in connection with a settlement of a dispute on DIP financing.

The bankruptcy bar is abuzz following the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 15-649, 2017 BL 89680, 85 U.S.L.W. 4115 (Sup. Ct. March 22, 2017), holding that bankruptcy courts may not approve structured dismissals that do not adhere to the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme.

Intercreditor agreements between multiple lenders are part and parcel of lending to a company with several tranches of debt. Under section 510 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”), “[a] subordination agreement is enforceable in a case under this title to the same extent that such agreement is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law.” 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (West 2017).

The sole shareholder of several closely held corporate entities engages in a fraudulent transfer by extinguishing one entity’s right to payment from a third party in exchange for the release of liabilities owed by other entities to that same third party. In Motorworld, Inc. v. William Benkendorf, et al., __ N.J. __ (Mar. 30, 2017), the New Jersey Supreme Court voided such a transfer against a Chapter 7 debtor corporation whose sole asset was a $600,000 loan receivable purportedly cancelled by the release.

The Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated ruling in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. ___ (2017)1 on March 21, reversing the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ affirmance of an order approving the distribution of the proceeds of settlement of bankruptcy estate causes of action to general unsecured creditors via structured dismissal, with no distribution to holders of priority wage claims.

The Court framed the question presented, and its ruling, very narrowly—twice. First:

In a very recent decision, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York determined that a negative inference to an exception to a negative covenant prevented a company from undertaking a proposed restructuring transaction. We find the case unique not because of the result necessarily, but rather because the court used the negative inference to override another express provision in the Credit Agreement.

Although there has been much discussion of the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Marblegate, this article addresses a question other commentators have yet to tackle: namely, how the Second Circuit’s decision impacts the Trust Indenture Act’s protection of guarantee obligations included in an indenture. Below we provide our view on how Marblegate affects indenture guarantees. More specifically, we discuss how the decision is consistent with provisions of the TIA that expressly protect a noteholder’s payment rights under a guarantee.

Synopsis

A debtor cannot recover sanctions or attorneys’ fees under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) when the debtor admits to having suffered no actual damages and the filing of a motion for sanctions was not necessary to remedy a stay violation.[1] Denying the debtor’s motion for sanctions, the U.S.

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Bankruptcy lawyers across the country learned this lesson in 2015: A fine year can be a flat year.