The sole shareholder of several closely held corporate entities engages in a fraudulent transfer by extinguishing one entity’s right to payment from a third party in exchange for the release of liabilities owed by other entities to that same third party. In Motorworld, Inc. v. William Benkendorf, et al., __ N.J. __ (Mar. 30, 2017), the New Jersey Supreme Court voided such a transfer against a Chapter 7 debtor corporation whose sole asset was a $600,000 loan receivable purportedly cancelled by the release.

The United States Supreme Court (the “Court”) recently issued a long-awaited decision in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. (“Jevic”), which limits the use of “structured dismissals” in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, requiring structured dismissals pursuant to which final distributions are made to comply with the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme, or the consent of all affected parties to be obtained.1

What is a Structured Dismissal?

The Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated ruling in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. ___ (2017)1 on March 21, reversing the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ affirmance of an order approving the distribution of the proceeds of settlement of bankruptcy estate causes of action to general unsecured creditors via structured dismissal, with no distribution to holders of priority wage claims.

The Court framed the question presented, and its ruling, very narrowly—twice. First:

In a very recent decision, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York determined that a negative inference to an exception to a negative covenant prevented a company from undertaking a proposed restructuring transaction. We find the case unique not because of the result necessarily, but rather because the court used the negative inference to override another express provision in the Credit Agreement.

Although there has been much discussion of the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Marblegate, this article addresses a question other commentators have yet to tackle: namely, how the Second Circuit’s decision impacts the Trust Indenture Act’s protection of guarantee obligations included in an indenture. Below we provide our view on how Marblegate affects indenture guarantees. More specifically, we discuss how the decision is consistent with provisions of the TIA that expressly protect a noteholder’s payment rights under a guarantee.

Synopsis

The new Companies Ordinance (Cap 622) enacted in 2012 was the first part of the effort to rewrite the statutory provisions relating to the incorporation and operation of companies. The remaining task of updating the winding up and insolvency provisions was completed in May 2016, when amendments to the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap 32) (CWUMPO) were passed into law. Although the implementation date of these amendments are to be announced by the government, it is time to look at the significant changes ahead.

The proposed bankruptcy sale of Golfsmith International Holdings to Dick’s Sporting Goods was recently approved, after the privacy ombudsman recommended that almost 10,000,000 consumer records (i.e., the personal information of consumers) of Golfsmith International Holdings can be transferred to Dick’s Sporting Goods.

On September 18, 2015, Margaret M. Okamoto (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint (the “Complaint”) in The United States District Court for the District of Nevada alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (the “FCRA”), against, inter alia, Bank of America, N.A. (“BOA”), Mutual of Omaha Bank (“MOB”), and Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”).  See Okamoto v. Bank of America et al., No. 2:15-cv-01800-GMN-GWF (Sept. 18, 2015).

In the bankruptcy context, effectively appealing an order confirming a debtor’s plan of reorganization is not always a sure bet, as a court may refuse to entertain the appeal in the name of equitable mootness.  Equitable mootness – “a judge-made abstention doctrine that allows a court to avoid hearing the merits of a bankruptcy appeal because implementing the requested relief would cause havoc”

Nearly four years after its decision in Stern v. Marshall raised new doubts about the place of bankruptcy courts in our legal system, the Supreme Court has finally put those doubts to rest. This week, in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, No. 13-935, the Court held that even for claims that must otherwise be resolved by an Article III court, a bankruptcy court may still adjudicate the matter based on consent.