Major changes to bankruptcy rules that govern the administration of consumer bankruptcy cases, and Chapter 13 cases in particular, were recently approved by the Supreme Court and transmitted to Congress.1 After several years of drafting and debate by the rules committee, these rule amendments will become effective December 1, 2017.

Introduction

In the recent case of BPE Solicitors v Hughes-Holland [2017] UKSC 21, the Supreme Court unanimously re-affirmed and clarified the principle established by the House of Lords in South Australian Asset Management Corporation v York Montague [1996] UKHL 10 (the “SAAMCO principle”). This article explains the clarification and the practical consequences it has for those seeking professional advice.

The SAAMCO principle

Summer 2017

Editor: Melanie Willems

IN THIS ISSUE

You Swynson, you lose some

by Robert Blackett 03

10

14

The rule of English law - why Brexit, however blindly foolish it

is, should not matter for arbitration

by Melanie Willems

Unintended consequences - be clear what you advise on

by Ryan Deane

T H E A R B I T E R [ S E A S O N ] 2 0 1 7 2

T H E A R B I T E R S U M M E R 2 0 1 7 3

You Swynson, you lose

some

by Robert Blacke

Lowick Rose LLP (in liquidaon) v Swynson

A case decided last week by the Sixth Circuit illustrates the importance of seeking bankruptcy claim policy amendments when placing D&O coverage. Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. Zucker (6th Cir. Jun. 20, 2017) involved the application of the insured-vs.-insured exclusion and specifically, whether the policy’s insured-vs.-insured exclusion precluded coverage for a claim brought by a company’s liquidating trust, to which the company’s claims had been assigned by the company as debtor-in-possession after the company filed for bankruptcy.

"The Parent Bank entered into this insurance contract with its eyes wide open and its wallet on its mind."

The Supreme Court of the United States inMidland v. Johnson reversed the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and held that a debt collector that files a proof of claim for debt that is barred by the applicable statute of limitations does not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) if the face of the proof of claim makes clear that the statute of limitations has run. The Supreme Court refused to accept the debtor's argument that Midland's proof of claim was "false, deceptive, or misleading" under the FDCPA.

In two recent decisions, both the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Fourth Circuit) and the Fifth Circuit (Fifth Circuit) concluded that certain orders entered in bankruptcy cases could not be grounds for invocation of res judicata with regard to proofs of claim that are deemed allowed. Both addressed the plain language of Section 502(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the Code) in conjunction with relevant Bankruptcy Rules and Official Forms, and congressional intent.

On March 9, 2017, a bankruptcy court in New York became the latest to weigh in on the developing circuit court split regarding whether modification of mortgages should be permitted under 11 U.S.C.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts (the District Court) recently issued an opinion in the Paul Sagendorph bankruptcy case reversing the Bankruptcy Court's holding that a debtor can force a secured creditor to take title to its collateral in complete satisfaction of the creditor's secured claim.1 In reversing the decision of the Bankruptcy Court, the District Court held that the plain language of Sections 1322(b)(9) and 1325(a)(5)(C)2 does not empower a debtor to force a secured creditor to accept title to its collateral over that creditor's objection.3

Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act (the "TIA") states the right of a bondholder to receive payments pursuant to an indenture security cannot be "impaired or affected without the consent of such holder." Historically, issuers and bondholders have not engaged in extensive litigation based on the argument that Section 316(b) provides a broad restriction protecting bondholders' substantive right to actually receive such payments.