"The Parent Bank entered into this insurance contract with its eyes wide open and its wallet on its mind."

The Supreme Court of the United States inMidland v. Johnson reversed the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and held that a debt collector that files a proof of claim for debt that is barred by the applicable statute of limitations does not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) if the face of the proof of claim makes clear that the statute of limitations has run. The Supreme Court refused to accept the debtor's argument that Midland's proof of claim was "false, deceptive, or misleading" under the FDCPA.

All Australian states have sale of goods legislation that, in certain circumstances, allows an unpaid seller to retain possession of goods in transit where the buyer becomes insolvent. The statutory right, called stoppage intransitu, is a useful remedy to obtain payment.

A registered security interest on the PPSR is not required to exercise the statutory right. Administrators and liquidators may be trumped by a notice under the stoppage in transitu provisions.

However, the sale of goods legislation is not identical in each state.

Competing claims to goods are common where there is an unpaid seller with alleged retention of title, the supplier’s customer has gone into external administration and the goods are in the possession of a transport or warehouse provider. Thrown into the mix may be an administrator or liquidator demanding possession of the goods to sell them.

The recent case of M Webster Holdings Pty Limited (administrators appointed) v Specific Freight Pty Limited [2017] FCA 269 illustrates how a transport provider can become ‘the meat in the sandwich’ when a consignee of goods becomes insolvent.

Webster, a fashion retailer, operated two well-known Australian businesses, David Lawrence and Marcs. Webster was placed into administration in February 2017 and its administrators continued to trade with a view to securing a purchaser.

In two recent decisions, both the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Fourth Circuit) and the Fifth Circuit (Fifth Circuit) concluded that certain orders entered in bankruptcy cases could not be grounds for invocation of res judicata with regard to proofs of claim that are deemed allowed. Both addressed the plain language of Section 502(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the Code) in conjunction with relevant Bankruptcy Rules and Official Forms, and congressional intent.

On March 9, 2017, a bankruptcy court in New York became the latest to weigh in on the developing circuit court split regarding whether modification of mortgages should be permitted under 11 U.S.C.

On 23 March 2017, Justice Robson of the Supreme Court of Victoria declined to follow the Victorian Court of Appeal decision of Re Enhill, finding that the decision was not binding with respect to different legislation (the Companies Act 1961 (Vic) as opposed to theCorporations Act 2001 (Cth)).

Background

Since the early 1980s, there has been a divergence of judicial opinion in the decisions of Re EnhillPty Ltd [1983] 1 VR 561 and Re Suco Gold Pty Ltd (in liq) (1983) 33 SASR 99.

On 17 March, in Hambleton v Finn [2017] QDC 61, McGill SC DCJ of the District Court of Queensland applied the section 553C(1) setoff under the Corporations Act 2001 to a liquidator’s insolvent trading claim against a director.

His Honour followed the earlier decision of the District Court of Queensland in Morton v Rexel Electrical Supplies Pty Ltd. In that case, the set-off provision was applied where the liquidator was seeking the recovery of unfair preference payments.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts (the District Court) recently issued an opinion in the Paul Sagendorph bankruptcy case reversing the Bankruptcy Court's holding that a debtor can force a secured creditor to take title to its collateral in complete satisfaction of the creditor's secured claim.1 In reversing the decision of the Bankruptcy Court, the District Court held that the plain language of Sections 1322(b)(9) and 1325(a)(5)(C)2 does not empower a debtor to force a secured creditor to accept title to its collateral over that creditor's objection.3