The U.S. Supreme Court recently scrutinized the proper application of the safe harbor found in Section 546(e) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code1 in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting Inc.2 While the Supreme Court's decision narrowed the reach of the safe harbor, it did little to change the landscape for the multi-billion dollar U.S. structured finance industry, including warehouse lending.

If a transaction by a company amounts to an "unlawful distribution", and the company subsequently goes into liquidation, will an action for recovery of the benefits of that distribution, brought against the directors who authorised the transaction, be statute-barred if it is commenced by the liquidator of the company more than 6 years after the distribution was made?

On February 27, 2018, the United States Supreme Court in a significant ruling held in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc. that transfers of property of a debtor in which financial institutions are mere conduits or intermediaries may be avoidable. The Court ruled that the safe harbor provisions of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code do not protect such transfers from avoidance.

DOMESTIC

Research on the impact of repossession risk on mortgage default

Terry O’Malley published an economic letter considering whether reducing the risk of repossession resulted in more Irish borrowers defaulting on their mortgages. The letter considers the impact of the ''Dunne judgment'' in 2011 which temporarily removed a bank's ability to lawfully repossess a home. One of the key findings was that borrowers defaulted on mortgages at a higher rate than if the repossession regime at the time was legally upheld.

Introduction

There are two principal mechanisms for the dissolution of a solvent Irish company:

• Voluntary Strike-Off (VSO); and
• Members' Voluntary Liquidation (MVL).

To the extent there are other Irish or EU entities in the group, it may also be possible to dissolve the company by way of merger with another group entity.

In Reilly & Personal Insolvency Acts 2012-2015 [2017] IEHC 558, Baker J, 5 October, 2017, the High Court held that applications to Court under Section 115A of the Personal Insolvency Acts 2012-2015 (the Acts), for approval of a Personal Insolvency Arrangement (PIA) despite its rejection by creditors, must be made by a Personal Insolvency Practitioner (PIP) and not by the Debtor themselves.

The Bankruptcy Code prohibits a chapter 13 debtor from modifying a mortgage lien on the debtor's principal residence. Even in situations in which a secured creditor fails to file a proof of claim or otherwise participate in the bankruptcy proceeding, the Bankruptcy Code allows a secured creditor's lien on a primary residence to pass through the bankruptcy unaffected. However, a recent decision from a bankruptcy court in Texas illustrates the risks to secured creditors of blind reliance on these statutory protections.

In March of this year, consumer electronics and home appliance retailer Gregg Appliances, Inc., better known as H.H. Gregg, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in Indianapolis, Indiana. H.H. Gregg, which took over many of the retail spaces previously occupied by Circuit City, is one of many big-box retailers that have sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy over the past several years. Like Circuit City, H.H. Gregg was unsuccessful in reorganizing in bankruptcy and is now seeking to recover payments made to vendors and other creditors within 90 days prior to the bankruptcy filing.

In MF Global Holdings Ltd. et al. v. Allied World Assurance Co. Ltd. et al., No. 1:16-ap-01251 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2017), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ordered MF Global Holdings Ltd. and Allied World Assurance Co. Ltd. to arbitrate their $15 million errors-and-omissions coverage dispute in Hamilton, Bermuda.

On July 19, 2017, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion in Arrow Oil & Gas, Inc., et al. v. J. Aron & Company, et al.(In re Semcrude, L.P., et al.), Case Nos. 15-3094, 15-3095, 15-3096 and 15-3097, affirming the Delaware bankruptcy court and district court, holding that upstream oil producers do not have an automatically perfected statutory security interest in oil sold even if Texas or Kansas law applied.