Introduction

In the recent case of BPE Solicitors v Hughes-Holland [2017] UKSC 21, the Supreme Court unanimously re-affirmed and clarified the principle established by the House of Lords in South Australian Asset Management Corporation v York Montague [1996] UKHL 10 (the “SAAMCO principle”). This article explains the clarification and the practical consequences it has for those seeking professional advice.

The SAAMCO principle

Summer 2017

Editor: Melanie Willems

IN THIS ISSUE

You Swynson, you lose some

by Robert Blackett 03

10

14

The rule of English law - why Brexit, however blindly foolish it

is, should not matter for arbitration

by Melanie Willems

Unintended consequences - be clear what you advise on

by Ryan Deane

T H E A R B I T E R [ S E A S O N ] 2 0 1 7 2

T H E A R B I T E R S U M M E R 2 0 1 7 3

You Swynson, you lose

some

by Robert Blacke

Lowick Rose LLP (in liquidaon) v Swynson

A case decided last week by the Sixth Circuit illustrates the importance of seeking bankruptcy claim policy amendments when placing D&O coverage. Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. Zucker (6th Cir. Jun. 20, 2017) involved the application of the insured-vs.-insured exclusion and specifically, whether the policy’s insured-vs.-insured exclusion precluded coverage for a claim brought by a company’s liquidating trust, to which the company’s claims had been assigned by the company as debtor-in-possession after the company filed for bankruptcy.

"The Parent Bank entered into this insurance contract with its eyes wide open and its wallet on its mind."

The Supreme Court of the United States inMidland v. Johnson reversed the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and held that a debt collector that files a proof of claim for debt that is barred by the applicable statute of limitations does not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) if the face of the proof of claim makes clear that the statute of limitations has run. The Supreme Court refused to accept the debtor's argument that Midland's proof of claim was "false, deceptive, or misleading" under the FDCPA.

On 28 March 2017, the Enactment of Extra-Statutory Concessions Order 2017[3] was made which, amongst other things, enacts ESC3.20. The Order came into force on 6 April 2017.

ESC3.20 disapplied the clawback of input tax credit for an insolvent business that has not paid (or not fully paid) the consideration for a supply. New section 26AA of the Value Added Tax Act 1994 gives broadly the same effect as ESC3.20 in that it “turns off” the disallowance of input tax in cases of non-payment of consideration if:

In two recent decisions, both the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Fourth Circuit) and the Fifth Circuit (Fifth Circuit) concluded that certain orders entered in bankruptcy cases could not be grounds for invocation of res judicata with regard to proofs of claim that are deemed allowed. Both addressed the plain language of Section 502(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the Code) in conjunction with relevant Bankruptcy Rules and Official Forms, and congressional intent.

On March 9, 2017, a bankruptcy court in New York became the latest to weigh in on the developing circuit court split regarding whether modification of mortgages should be permitted under 11 U.S.C.

The insolvency service has published the latest figures for complaints against insolvency practitioners made to the Complaints Gateway during 2016. The statistics indicate that the Gateway has received a reasonably steady level of complaints since it was established in 2013 but promisingly for practitioners the Gateway does appear to be weeding out more complaints with the Gateway having rejected 29% of complaints in 2016, compared to 18% in the Gateway's first year.

The Stats

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts (the District Court) recently issued an opinion in the Paul Sagendorph bankruptcy case reversing the Bankruptcy Court's holding that a debtor can force a secured creditor to take title to its collateral in complete satisfaction of the creditor's secured claim.1 In reversing the decision of the Bankruptcy Court, the District Court held that the plain language of Sections 1322(b)(9) and 1325(a)(5)(C)2 does not empower a debtor to force a secured creditor to accept title to its collateral over that creditor's objection.3