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Following the liquidation of BHS Ltd, the High Court was asked to consider whether a landlord could claim full rent as an administration expense following termination of the CVA.

Background

Wright and another (Liquidators of SHB Realisations Ltd) v The Prudential Assurance Company Ltd concerned three principal insolvency processes applicable to companies under the Insolvency Act 1986:

The U.S. Supreme Court recently scrutinized the proper application of the safe harbor found in Section 546(e) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code1 in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting Inc.2 While the Supreme Court's decision narrowed the reach of the safe harbor, it did little to change the landscape for the multi-billion dollar U.S. structured finance industry, including warehouse lending.

The Court of Appeal has held that refusal of consent for both good and bad reasons will not automatically render that refusal unreasonable.

Background

Most commercial leases require tenants to obtain the consent of their landlord prior to assigning their lease. If so, the Landlord and Tenant Act 1988 (the Act) applies to say that if the tenant serves a valid application for consent, the landlord will be subject to the following duties:

On February 27, 2018, the United States Supreme Court in a significant ruling held in Merit Management Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc. that transfers of property of a debtor in which financial institutions are mere conduits or intermediaries may be avoidable. The Court ruled that the safe harbor provisions of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code do not protect such transfers from avoidance.

The Pension Protection Fund (PPF) published new forms of contingent asset agreements in January along with new contingent asset guidance. It follows its publication of a final determination and levy policy statement in December for the levy year 2018/29.

Background

A recent Court of Session case has made clear that a Scottish court cannot wind up or make an administration order in respect of an English registered company, and the same applies to English courts and Scottish companies.

The Bankruptcy Code prohibits a chapter 13 debtor from modifying a mortgage lien on the debtor's principal residence. Even in situations in which a secured creditor fails to file a proof of claim or otherwise participate in the bankruptcy proceeding, the Bankruptcy Code allows a secured creditor's lien on a primary residence to pass through the bankruptcy unaffected. However, a recent decision from a bankruptcy court in Texas illustrates the risks to secured creditors of blind reliance on these statutory protections.

In March of this year, consumer electronics and home appliance retailer Gregg Appliances, Inc., better known as H.H. Gregg, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in Indianapolis, Indiana. H.H. Gregg, which took over many of the retail spaces previously occupied by Circuit City, is one of many big-box retailers that have sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy over the past several years. Like Circuit City, H.H. Gregg was unsuccessful in reorganizing in bankruptcy and is now seeking to recover payments made to vendors and other creditors within 90 days prior to the bankruptcy filing.

In Saw v Wilson, the Court of Appeal held that a second ranking floating charge would be valid and enforceable, even if at the time it was created there were no uncharged assets to which the floating charge could attach.

Facts of the case

In MF Global Holdings Ltd. et al. v. Allied World Assurance Co. Ltd. et al., No. 1:16-ap-01251 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2017), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ordered MF Global Holdings Ltd. and Allied World Assurance Co. Ltd. to arbitrate their $15 million errors-and-omissions coverage dispute in Hamilton, Bermuda.