Summer 2017

Editor: Melanie Willems

IN THIS ISSUE

You Swynson, you lose some

by Robert Blackett 03

10

14

The rule of English law - why Brexit, however blindly foolish it

is, should not matter for arbitration

by Melanie Willems

Unintended consequences - be clear what you advise on

by Ryan Deane

T H E A R B I T E R [ S E A S O N ] 2 0 1 7 2

T H E A R B I T E R S U M M E R 2 0 1 7 3

You Swynson, you lose

some

by Robert Blacke

Lowick Rose LLP (in liquidaon) v Swynson

A case decided last week by the Sixth Circuit illustrates the importance of seeking bankruptcy claim policy amendments when placing D&O coverage. Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. Zucker (6th Cir. Jun. 20, 2017) involved the application of the insured-vs.-insured exclusion and specifically, whether the policy’s insured-vs.-insured exclusion precluded coverage for a claim brought by a company’s liquidating trust, to which the company’s claims had been assigned by the company as debtor-in-possession after the company filed for bankruptcy.

"The Parent Bank entered into this insurance contract with its eyes wide open and its wallet on its mind."

The Supreme Court of the United States inMidland v. Johnson reversed the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and held that a debt collector that files a proof of claim for debt that is barred by the applicable statute of limitations does not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) if the face of the proof of claim makes clear that the statute of limitations has run. The Supreme Court refused to accept the debtor's argument that Midland's proof of claim was "false, deceptive, or misleading" under the FDCPA.

As Insurers underwriting risks in Spain are aware, the recent financial crisis resulted in a significant increase in claims against directors by trustees appointed when a company enters into an insolvency process. Insolvency proceedings in Spain reach a determination as to the culpability of directors implicated in the company's demise. In this context, the Spanish courts will look at whether the directors were "guilty" or whether the insolvency was "fortuitous". However, not all determinations will express whether the director's conduct was in bad faith or wilful.

The Insolvency Rules 2016 came into force on 6 April 2017 and seek to modernise the insolvency process. These changes were, in part, brought about by the changes to insolvency law and practice as a result of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 ("the Act"). Now is therefore a good time to take stock of the other key changes brought about by the Act that were anticipated to impact on D&O claims.

In two recent decisions, both the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Fourth Circuit) and the Fifth Circuit (Fifth Circuit) concluded that certain orders entered in bankruptcy cases could not be grounds for invocation of res judicata with regard to proofs of claim that are deemed allowed. Both addressed the plain language of Section 502(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the Code) in conjunction with relevant Bankruptcy Rules and Official Forms, and congressional intent.

On March 9, 2017, a bankruptcy court in New York became the latest to weigh in on the developing circuit court split regarding whether modification of mortgages should be permitted under 11 U.S.C.

The Insolvency Rules 2016 ("IR 2016") are due to come into force in England and Wales on 6 April 2017. Its purpose is to modernise and streamline the insolvency process in England and Wales in order to reduce the costs and potentially increase returns to creditors. IR 2016 incorporates the changes to insolvency law and practice brought about by the Deregulation Act 2015 and the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015.

This article highlights the principal areas of change and their practical implications.

Background

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts (the District Court) recently issued an opinion in the Paul Sagendorph bankruptcy case reversing the Bankruptcy Court's holding that a debtor can force a secured creditor to take title to its collateral in complete satisfaction of the creditor's secured claim.1 In reversing the decision of the Bankruptcy Court, the District Court held that the plain language of Sections 1322(b)(9) and 1325(a)(5)(C)2 does not empower a debtor to force a secured creditor to accept title to its collateral over that creditor's objection.3