INTRODUCTION

In times of unprecedented market uncertainty, assessing financial exposure to your counterparties is essential. Volatility in the commodities markets and a public health crisis create the perfect storm for financial distress for companies in nearly every industry. Risk is inherent in business and that risk is heightened when you are dealing with a company in financial distress. Managing these risks begins with knowing your counterparties and understanding your legal position with respect to those counterparties.

Countries across the world are actively taking measures to stem the spread of COVID-19 by encouraging and, in some cases, forcing social distancing. One of the most common measures employed so far is the closing of non-essential stores, bars and restaurants for several weeks, if not longer. Several large retailers, such as JCPenney, Ross Stores, Kirkland’s Inc., Marshalls and TJ Maxx, have announced store closings for two weeks in efforts to help stop the spread of COVID-19.

During these uncertain times, bankruptcy courts across the country remain steadfast in their commitment to serve the public and provide critical relief to debtor companies and their many constituents, including employees, lenders, and other parties in interest. To address public concern about COVID-19 and to protect all parties, many bankruptcy courts have issued general orders implementing procedures and adopting protocols that balance public health and safety with parties’ need for emergency relief from the court.

On March 6, 2020, the Ontario Court of Appeal (the “OCA”) released its decision in Royal Bank of Canada v. Bodanis (“Bodanis”),¹ holding that two debtors, each having an estate exceeding $10,000 in value, had appeals of their bankruptcy orders as of right under section 193 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act²(the “BIA”) and thus did not need to seek leave to appeal.

Section 193 reads as follows:

On December 30, 2019, the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador (the “NLSC”) released its decision in Re Norcon Marine Services Ltd.¹ (“Norcon Marine”), dismissing both an application by a debtor for continuance of its Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act² (“BIA”) proposal proceedings under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act³ (“CCAA”) and a competing application by a secured creditor for the appointment of a receiver.

On October 10, 2019, the Supreme Court of British Columbia (the “BCSC” or the “Court”) released its decision in 8640025 Canada Inc. (Re)¹ (“8640025 Canada”), denying an application to replace the monitor (the “Monitor”) in a Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act² (the "CCAA") proceeding because the applicant was not a creditor and therefore had no standing to bring such an application.

On January 29, 2020, the Alberta Court of Appeal (the “Alberta CA”) released its decision in PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc. v Perpetual Energy Inc.¹ (“Perpetual Energy”), granting applications requiring a trustee in bankruptcy (the “Trustee”) to post security for costs on appeals brought by the Trustee.

The Quebec Court of Appeal’s unanimous decision in Gestion Éric Savard¹ reaffirms the super-priority ranking of CCAA² DIP financing³ over regular unpaid post-filing obligations, absent steps being taken to reverse this usual order of priorities.

In 7636156 Canada Inc. v. OMERS Realty Corporation¹ (“7636156 v. OMERS”), the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the “Court”) held that a bankrupt’s landlord was only entitled to have drawn down on a letter of credit by an amount equal to the landlord’s priority claim for three months’ accelerated rent, rather than by the full amount of the letter of credit, and ordered that the landlord pay over the excess to the bankrupt’s trustee.

On December 3, 2019, the Ontario Court of Appeal (the “OCA”) released its decision in 1732427 Ontario Inc. v. 1787930 Ontario Inc.¹ At issue was a pre-authorized debit payment processed by a supplier after a debtor filed a notice of intention to file a proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the “BIA”). The motion judge had found this payment to be an exercise of a creditor remedy prohibited by the stay provisions of subsection 69(1) of the BIA.