Historically, investment grade debt with a make-whole provision was fairly straightforward. At any time during the life of the instrument, the issuer had the right to redeem the debt. But the price to be paid included the discounted value of the remaining payments of principal and interest over the life of the debt. Because the cost of paying the “make-whole” is often significant, issuers seldom redeem bonds when they are required to pay the make-whole price.

On May 1, 2015, the Alberta Court of Appeal rendered its decision in 1773907 Alberta Ltd. v. Davidson, 2015 ABCA 150, and allowed an appeal permitting an action, brought in the name of an insolvent company, to proceed, notwithstanding that the company had assigned this claim to a third party. As will be discussed, the assignment of an action to a third party is often found to be caught by the doctrines of champerty and maintenance, and the decision by the Court serves to identify where such an assignment will be permitted.

On May 4, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States issued an opinion regarding a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (the “First Circuit”).1 The question on appeal was whether debtor Louis Bullard (“Bullard”) could immediately appeal the bankruptcy court’s order denying confirmation of his proposed Chapter 13 payment plan (the “Plan”).2 The Court held that denial of confirmation of a debtor’s plan is not a final, appealable order.3  

Case Background

© 2015 Hunton & Williams LLP 1 May 2015 Oak Rock Financial District Court Addresses the Applicable Legal Standard for True Participation Agreements The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York recently applied two tests, the True Participation Test and the Disguised Loan Test, to determine whether agreements were true participation agreements or disguised loans.1 In addition, the District Court noted that the most important question in such a determination is the risk of loss allocation in the transaction, and that if an alleged participant is not subject to the

In Quadrant Structured Products Company, Ltd. v. Vertin, the Delaware Court of Chancery made two key rulings concerning the rights of creditors to bring derivative lawsuits against corporate directors.¹  First,  the court held that there is no continuous insolvency requirement during the pendency of the lawsuit.

On June 6, 2014, Justice Brown of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) released additional reasons¹ to his decision in Romspen Investment Corp. v. 6711162 Canada Inc., 2014 ONSC 2781, centred on the cost submissions made by counsel to Romspen Investment Corp. (“Romspen”). Despite a contractual provision in a mortgage agreement that gave the applicant, Romspen, a right to full indemnity costs from the respondents, Justice Brown found that the legal fees incurred by counsel to Romspen were unreasonable.

In two recent cases, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York has indicated that Section 316(b) of Trust Indenture Act of 19391 (the “TIA”) requires unanimous consent for out-of- court restructurings that impair bondholders’ practical ability to receive payments, even if the bondholders’ technical, legal ability to receive payments remains intact.

Factoring is a common way for businesses to monetize current assets. Typically, in a factoring transaction, an enterprise sells its accounts receivable to a third party (commonly a bank, but not always), which, in exchange for a discount on the value of the receivables, takes on the effort and time commitment related to collecting the accounts. 

The recent decision by the Court of Appeal for Ontario (the “Court”) in 306440 Ontario Ltd. v. 782127 Ontario Ltd.¹ serves as a cautionary reminder to secured creditors that their position may not always be at the top of the insolvency food chain, even when they have taken all the proper steps to perfect their security interests.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently entered an order confirming that when a fraudulent transfer defendant is able to establish a defense pursuant to 11 U.S.C.