The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently held in the bankruptcy proceedings of Nortel Networks Inc., et al. (“Nortel”), Case No. 09-10138 (KG), that it would not second guess the work of an indenture trustee and its counsel on matters related to the trustee (i) in its capacity as indenture trustee on behalf of noteholders; (ii) in its capacity as a member of a creditors’ committee; and (iii) in defending its fees.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts (the District Court) recently issued an opinion in the Paul Sagendorph bankruptcy case reversing the Bankruptcy Court's holding that a debtor can force a secured creditor to take title to its collateral in complete satisfaction of the creditor's secured claim.1 In reversing the decision of the Bankruptcy Court, the District Court held that the plain language of Sections 1322(b)(9) and 1325(a)(5)(C)2 does not empower a debtor to force a secured creditor to accept title to its collateral over that creditor's objection.3

Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act (the "TIA") states the right of a bondholder to receive payments pursuant to an indenture security cannot be "impaired or affected without the consent of such holder." Historically, issuers and bondholders have not engaged in extensive litigation based on the argument that Section 316(b) provides a broad restriction protecting bondholders' substantive right to actually receive such payments.

On appeal from a decision in the In re Energy Future Holdings Corp. bankruptcy case, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently held that contractual make-whole premium provisions are enforceable where the obligation to repay bond debt is accelerated by a bankruptcy filing.

In a prior post, we set forth the potential liability of employers for collection of debts owed by employees in violation of the bankruptcy stay. To protect themselves from such liability, employers that accrue claims against their employees in the ordinary course of business should implement written protocols designed in consultation with bankruptcy counsel.

In 2009, General Motors (“Old GM”) commenced a chapter 11 case and sold the bulk of its business and assets to a new entity (“New GM”) “free and clear” of liabilities against New GM. Notwithstanding the “free and clear” language of the 2009 sale order (the “Sale Order”), a Second Circuit panel recently held that plaintiffs could assert claims against New GM over faulty ignition switches in cars manufactured by Old GM and recalled in early 2014.

The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently held that the Bankruptcy Code Section 546(e) safe harbors do not prevent a liquidation trust from pursuing some state law constructive fraudulent conveyance claims assigned to the trust by creditors.1 Notably, the Bankruptcy Court declined to follow the Second Circuit's recent Tribune decision, in which the Second Circuit concluded that the Section 546(e) safe harbors apply to state law constructive fraudulent conveyance claims on federal preemption grounds.2 Instead, the Bankruptcy Court decided that federal preemption did not appl

In a highly anticipated decision, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the "Court") on June 28, 2016, dismissed Counts I through XIX of Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.'s ("LBSF") fourth amended complaint (the "Complaint") in Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. Bank of America, N.A., et al.1 In doing so, the Court removed the majority of the approximately 250 noteholder, issuer and indenture trustee defendants from the LBSF lawsuit to recover over $1 billion distributed in connection with 44 swap transactions.

Businesses need to have written protocols in place to deal with bankruptcy filings by their employees and independent contractors, or they risk serious sanctions and, potentially, punitive damages for violations of the bankruptcy laws. Consider two examples.

The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the "Federal Reserve") recently issued a proposed rule (the "Proposed Rule") that would significantly limit derivative counterparty remedies upon the insolvency of US global systematically important banking organizations ("GSIB") and their affiliates and the US operations of foreign GSIBs (collectively, "Covered Entities").