The Eleventh Circuit has revisited the question of when a debtor may be judicially estopped from pursuing a civil lawsuit due to his or her failure to disclose the claims forming the basis of the lawsuit in their bankruptcy. Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine intended to protect courts against parties who seek to manipulate the judicial process by changing their legal positions to suit the exigencies of the moment.

The Bankruptcy Code prohibits a chapter 13 debtor from modifying a mortgage lien on the debtor's principal residence. Even in situations in which a secured creditor fails to file a proof of claim or otherwise participate in the bankruptcy proceeding, the Bankruptcy Code allows a secured creditor's lien on a primary residence to pass through the bankruptcy unaffected. However, a recent decision from a bankruptcy court in Texas illustrates the risks to secured creditors of blind reliance on these statutory protections.

In March of this year, consumer electronics and home appliance retailer Gregg Appliances, Inc., better known as H.H. Gregg, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in Indianapolis, Indiana. H.H. Gregg, which took over many of the retail spaces previously occupied by Circuit City, is one of many big-box retailers that have sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy over the past several years. Like Circuit City, H.H. Gregg was unsuccessful in reorganizing in bankruptcy and is now seeking to recover payments made to vendors and other creditors within 90 days prior to the bankruptcy filing.

In MF Global Holdings Ltd. et al. v. Allied World Assurance Co. Ltd. et al., No. 1:16-ap-01251 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2017), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ordered MF Global Holdings Ltd. and Allied World Assurance Co. Ltd. to arbitrate their $15 million errors-and-omissions coverage dispute in Hamilton, Bermuda.

Last year, Burr & Forman lawyers won a decisive victory in the Eleventh Circuit, in the case of In re Failla, 838 F.3d 1170 (11th Cir. 2016). In Failla, the Eleventh Circuit held that a debtor who files a statement of intention to “surrender” his or her house in bankruptcy may not oppose the secured creditor’s foreclosure proceeding in state court. Failla is a significant victory for secured creditors for two primary reasons. First, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the meaning of “surrender,” as used in 11 U.S.C.

On July 19, 2017, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion in Arrow Oil & Gas, Inc., et al. v. J. Aron & Company, et al.(In re Semcrude, L.P., et al.), Case Nos. 15-3094, 15-3095, 15-3096 and 15-3097, affirming the Delaware bankruptcy court and district court, holding that upstream oil producers do not have an automatically perfected statutory security interest in oil sold even if Texas or Kansas law applied.

A common issue that arises in many bankruptcy cases is whether a creditor who refuses to return collateral that he repossessed prior to the petition date violates the automatic stay. In February, the Tenth Circuit widened a circuit split by adopting the minority position that to violate the automatic stay in bankruptcy a creditor must take action, not merely retain the property of the estate. The Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C. 362, prohibits any post-petition "act to obtain possession of property of the estate or ...

Major changes to bankruptcy rules that govern the administration of consumer bankruptcy cases, and Chapter 13 cases in particular, were recently approved by the Supreme Court and transmitted to Congress.1 After several years of drafting and debate by the rules committee, these rule amendments will become effective December 1, 2017.

Signed, sealed, delivered, but am I yours? Apparently not, according to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, at least in the context of allowed administrative expense claims under Section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code.1 The Third Circuit recently considered and ruled in a case as to when goods are deemed “received” for the purposes of determining whether a creditor may recover the value of the goods as an allowed administrative expense claim under the Bankruptcy Code.

Introduction

In the recent case of BPE Solicitors v Hughes-Holland [2017] UKSC 21, the Supreme Court unanimously re-affirmed and clarified the principle established by the House of Lords in South Australian Asset Management Corporation v York Montague [1996] UKHL 10 (the “SAAMCO principle”). This article explains the clarification and the practical consequences it has for those seeking professional advice.

The SAAMCO principle