The recent depression in the maritime shipping industry served as the catalyst for many shipping companies to restructure. During the past few years, a number of foreign-based shipping companies have sought protection from creditors in U.S. Bankruptcy Courts—with varying degrees of success.
A unanimous Supreme Court, in Executive Benefits Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Arkinson (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc.), 573 U.S. ___ (2014), confirmed a bankruptcy court’s power to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for the district court’s de novo review, even though such court is constitutionally barred from entering a final judgment on a bankruptcy-related claim under Stern v. Marshall.
On June 9, 2014, the United States Supreme Court addressed an issue left open in Stern v. Marshall.1 Instead of bringing clarity to procedural confusion created by Stern, the Court’s opinion in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v.
A recent decision by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington found that certain distressed debt funds were not “financial institutions” under the definition of “Eligible Assignee” in the applicable loan agreement and thus were not entitled to vote on the debtor’s chapter 11 plan of reorganization. The District Court decision affirmed a bankruptcy court decision enjoining loan assignments to the funds and recently denied the funds’ motion to vacate the decision.”1
On May 23, 2014, the Federal Trade Commission announced that the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection sent a letter to the court overseeing the bankruptcy proceedings for ConnectEDU Inc. (“ConnectEDU”), an education technology company, warning that the proposed sale of the company’s assets raises privacy concerns.
Although Section 506(b) of the Bankruptcy Code explicitly allows payment of post-petition interest to holders of oversecured claims (i.e., where the value of the collateral exceeds the amount of the claim), the Bankruptcy Code does not describe how to calculate it. No bright line rules exist dictating how to determine oversecured status, the timing of the valuation, and the rate and type of interest to be paid to oversecured creditors. Computation of post-petition interest is a frequent topic of debate among the courts.
Both the Loan Syndications and Trading Association, Inc. (the “LSTA”) and the Loan Market Association (the “LMA”) publish the forms of documentation used by sophisticated financial entities involved in the trading of large corporate syndicated loans in the secondary trading market. The LSTA based in New York was founded in 1995. The LMA based in London was formed in 1996. Both the LSTA and LMA share the common aim of assisting in developing best practices and standard documentation to facilitate the growth and liquidity of efficient trading of syndicated corporate loans.
In a novel decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held, in its ruling In re Emoral, Inc., 740 F.3d 875 (3d Cir. 2014), that personal injury claims of individuals allegedly harmed by a bankrupt debtor’s products cannot be asserted against a pre-petition purchaser of the debtor’s assets, as they are “generalized claims” which belong to the debtor’s bankruptcy estate rather than to the individuals who suffered the harm.
Background
Despite the absence of any provision in the Bankruptcy Code expressly authorizing the recharacterization of a debt claim to an equity interest, it generally is well-established that recharacterization is within the broad powers afforded a bankruptcy court under section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and is necessary for the proper application of the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme.1 In a recharacterization analysis, a
bankruptcy court ignores the labels of a transaction, examines the facts, and determines whether a
In the recent case of Davis v. Elliot Mgmt. Corp. (In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48102 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014), the District Court for the Southern District of New York issued a decision barring reorganization plans from paying legal fees of individual members of official creditors’ committees absent a showing of substantial contribution to the estate.