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  • Prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, we were seeing an increase in business restructurings and distressed transactions (whether going-concern sales or liquidations). Certain industries (e.g., retail and pharmaceuticals) were harder hit.
  • However, the pandemic and the resultant market turmoil will not be confined to any one industry (although some — airlines, hotels, cruises, sporting and entertainment, shipping, manufacturing reliant on foreign parts and, of course, retail — may be hit harder). Energy, oil and gas are suffering additional disruptions.
  • In its recent decision in Rodriguez v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., No. 18–1269 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 25, 2020), the Supreme Court held that federal courts may not apply the federal common law “Bob Richards Rule” to determine who owns a tax refund when a parent holding company files a tax return but a subsidiary generated the losses giving rise to the refund. Instead, the court should look to applicable state law.

    General Legal Background

    On 4 February 2020, the Federal Court of Australia considered the circumstances in which it might be said that a provisional liquidator of a company ought not be appointed as the official liquidator because of an alleged "reasonable apprehension of bias". The issue was ventilated before the Court in the matter of  Frisken (as receiver of Avant Garde Investments Pty Ltd v Cheema [2020] FCA 98.

    Appointing a provisional liquidator

    Entering into liquidation can be a scary time for any company and its officers, even one which chooses to do so voluntarily. However, the directors, shareholders and creditors of a company entering into liquidation do not have absolute discretion as to who they may appoint as the liquidator of the company. Together, the Corporations Act and common law principles of independence regulate the eligibility of a liquidator to be appointed to a company, and to remain in the appointment.

    Overarching eligibility

    What makes a contract an unprofitable contract which can be disclaimed by a trustee in bankruptcy without the leave of the Court under section 133(5A) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Bankruptcy Act)? Can a litigation funding agreement be considered an unprofitable contract when the agreement provides for a significant funder's premium or charge of 80% (85% in the case of an appeal)?

    The Bottom Line

    In Whirlpool Corp. v. Wells Fargo Bank (In re hhgregg Inc.), Case No. 18-3363 (7th Cir. Feb. 11, 2020), the Seventh Circuit held that a trade creditor’s later-in-time reclamation claim was subordinate to lenders’ pre-petition and debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) financing liens. The Seventh Circuit found that Sction 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code creates a “federal priority rule,” making clear that a reclamation claim is subordinate to prior rights of a secured creditor.

    What Happened?

    The Bottom Line

    In an opinion dated Jan. 10, 2020, Bankruptcy Judge Craig A. Gargotta of the Western District of Texas (San Antonio Division) held that a creditor who submits a proof of claim in bankruptcy waives its right to a jury trial, regardless of whether the creditor has couched its claim in protective language purporting to reserve its right to a jury trial. See Schmidt v. AAF Players LLC (In re Legendary Field Exhibitions LLC), 19-05053 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2020).

    What Happened?

    Background

    The Bottom Line

    The United States Supreme Court recently issued a unanimous decision in Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, No. 19-938 589 U.S. __ (2020), which held that a bankruptcy court’s unreserved denial of a motion for relief from the automatic stay is a final, immediately appealable order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 158.

    What Happened

    Introduction

    In February 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion that, at first blush, appeared to severely curtail the scope of the transferee protections provided by Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the “safe harbor” provision that shields specified types of payments from a bankruptcy trustee’s avoidance powers, including transfers “made by or to (or for the benefit of)” a “financial institution” in connection with a “securities contract.” A recent decision from the Second Circuit breathes fresh life into the defense.