The Bottom Line

A recent case in New York State Supreme Court, One Williams Street Capital Management LP v. U.S. Education Loan Trust IV, LLC (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. May 15, 2015), affords a useful opportunity to review the applicability and scope of §13-107 of the New York General Obligations Law, which provides that a transfer of a bond “vests in the transferee all claims or demands of the transferrer.” The court observed that §13-107 extends to all claims, whether in contract or in tort, including fraud.

Our two-part article on non-con and true sale issues in insurance contexts continues with a deeper dive into the considerations that distinguish these issues from similar remoteness principles in a Bankruptcy Code context. In Part One, we explained some of the basics of state insurance law that bear on these issues and how these can give rise to different approaches in opinion-giving; in this Part Two, we identify some practical obstacles that arise in these kinds of contexts and opinions.

A Pennsylvania Hypothetical

Indentures and other agreements governing complex, multitiered structured debt products will typically contain a series of reserves, the adequacy of whose funding will take precedence over payments to noteholders. While the funding requirements of the reserve accounts will be set forth in the agreement, the formulation of these provisions will leave administrators considerable leeway in determining the cash maintenance levels appropriate for the various accounts. In a recent case, UMB National Association v. Airplanes Limited (S.D.N.Y.

This two-part article discusses the key concerns, from a non-consolidation and true sale perspective, that arise when an insurance company, as opposed to a bankruptcy-eligible entity, is a sponsor/seller in a securitization or similar structured finance transaction. This Part One introduces the main contrasts between non-con and true sale analysis in a traditional bankruptcy context and such analysis in an insurance-law scenario.

Unlike an opinion, an order of the court is often not from the pen of the judge. Typically, a court order is submitted to the judge after negotiation among the parties. So, when a disagreement arises among the parties regarding the interpretation of the court’s order, how does the judge who signed the order go about resolving the matter? The issue came up not long ago in Outer Harbor Terminal LLC (Bkr. D. Del. May, 5, 2017), in which Judge Laurie Silverstein of the District of  Delaware bankruptcy court was confronted with a dispute over her own final DIP order.

As of 1st October 2017, debt recovery and collections in both the commercial and consumer world is going to see a big change with the introduction of the debt recovery Pre-Action Protocol (‘PAP’).

There has been a previous pre-action protocol, introduced in 2014, which was in many ways accepted as a sensible approach to collection of all debts.

The Bottom Line

The Bottom Line

Ever since the introduction of the ‘out of court’ procedure to appointment an administrator, there has been a practice of filing successive Notices of Intention to Appoint an Administrator. This practice has been the topic of much discussion and its legality was recently addressed by the Court of Appeal in the case of JCAM Commercial Real Estate Property XV Limited –v- Davis Haulage Limited [2017] EWCA Civ 267.

Introduction