The Ninth Circuit, in Blixseth v. Credit Suisse, 961 F.3d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir. 2020), issued a significant decision on the issue of whether nonconsensual third-party releases are ever permitted in Chapter 11 plans. Distinguishing its prior decisions on the topic, the Ninth Circuit permitted a nonconsensual third-party release that was limited to the exculpation of participants in the reorganization from claims based on actions taken during the case.
Statutory Background
The Bottom Line
The Bottom Line
The Bottom Line
Recently, in In re Dura Automotive Systems, No. 19-12378 (Bankr. D. Del. June 9, 2020), the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that granting the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the Committee) derivative standing on behalf of the debtors – a Delaware limited liability company – was precluded by the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act (the Delaware LLC Act).
What Happened?
On 26 June 2020 the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (the Act) came into force, introducing a number of temporary measures to assist companies facing financial difficulties as a consequence of COVID-19. These temporary provisions apply retroactively to cover the period commencing 1 March 2020 (26 March 2020 with respect to corporate governance provisions) and ending on 30 September 2020 (the Relevant Period).
On 25 June 2020, the Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (the Act) received Royal Assent, and the majority of its provisions are now in force. The Act has introduced a number of permanent reforms and temporary measures, which together represent the most significant change to English insolvency law in nearly 20 years.
Permanent Reforms
The permanent reforms include:
Historically, the interests of landlords whose commercial real estate is occupied by debtors in Chapter 11 proceedings have been generally well protected. Indeed, Section 365(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code requires the debtor to timely perform all of its post-petition obligations under its nonresidential leases of real property — most important among those, rent.
The Bottom Line
In Lariat Cos. v. Wigley(In re Wigley), Case No. 18-3489 (8th Cir. March 9, 2020), the Eighth Circuit held that a claim against Debtor B that arose out of a fraudulent transfer made by Debtor A to Debtor B was subject to the statutory cap applicable to lease rejection damages where Debtor A’s underlying liability was premised on its breach of a lease.
What Happened?