For many litigants, the decision whether to prosecute or defend a lawsuit vigorously boils down to a rather basic calculus: What are my chances of success? What is the potential recovery or loss? Is this a “bet the company” litigation? And, how much will I have to pay the lawyers? In many respects, it is not all that different from a poker player eyeing his chip stack and deciding whether the pot odds and implied odds warrant the call of a big bet.
In Freshvest Investments (Pty) Ltd v Marabeng (Pty) Ltd (1030/2015) [2016] ZASCA 168, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) was afforded the opportunity to pronounce on the so called Badenhorst rule which assumes its name from Badenhorst v Northern Construction Enterprises (Pty) Ltd 1956 (2) SA 346 (T).
Affirmative action measures were introduced in South Africa to reconcile the injustices of the past. Although policies have been implemented for the achievement of equality for persons previously disadvantaged, at what point do these policies unjustifiably infringe the rights of persons affected by them?
On January 17, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rendered a much anticipated decision in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Corp., No. 15-2124-cv(L), 15-2141-cv(CON), reversing the Southern District of New York's holding that only a non-consensual amendment to an indenture's core payment terms violates Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act (TIA).
On November 17, 2016, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Delaware Trust Co. v. Energy Future Intermediate Holding Co. LLC, No. 16-1351 (3d Cir. Nov. 17, 2016) clarified the often-muddy interplay between indenture acceleration provisions and "make-whole" redemption provisions, holding that Energy Future Intermediate Holding Co. LLC and EFIH Finance Inc. (collectively, "EFIH") were unable to avoid paying lenders approximately $800 million in expected interest by voluntarily filing for bankruptcy.
Sometimes different bits of legislation are, on the face of it, in conflict with each other. This is specially so when new law is introduced. The impact of new law on old law sets up contradictions, which the courts have to sort out. An interesting recent example arose in the context of business rescue.
The issue in this case was whether a payment of R389 593.49 by Ditona – a company being wound-up – to another company Eravin, was recoverable by Ditona’s liquidators as a void disposition or unrecoverable because, it was a pre-business rescue debt, which may not be enforced.
On 21 September 2016, the Western Cape High Court (Court) handed down judgement in the case of Tyre Corporation Cape Town (Pty) Ltd and Others v GT Logistics (Pty) Ltd and Others (Rogers J) [2016] ZAWCHC 124 in terms of which the Court considered, among other questions, the following:
It is now generally accepted that the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (Act) is an overhaul of our corporate law landscape. This shift is even more evident with the introduction of a new business rescue regime and along with it, the general moratorium on legal proceedings against a company in business rescue.
Section 133 of the Act provides that no legal proceedings including enforcement action may commence or continue against a company undergoing business rescue, save where amongst other exceptions, consent is granted by the court or obtained from the business rescue practitioner.
Prescription is one word which every creditor (and attorney) dread. Prescription extinguishes a debt and there is very little a creditor can do once that proverbial ship has sailed.
The Prescription Act, No 68 of 1969 (Prescription Act), on a good day, has its challenges, but the situation is even more uncertain when an insolvent estate is concerned.
Rogers J, with Nuku J concurring, in the recent judgment of Van Deventer and Another v Nedbank Ltd 2016 (3) SA 622 (WCC) shed some very needed light on this issue.