Introduction

In light of the decisions made in the case of BTI 2014 LLC v Sequana SA [2019] EWCA Civ 112 (the Sequana case), consideration may need to be given to the interests of creditors when declaring a dividend. The Court of Appeal in the Sequana case concluded that the payment of an otherwise lawful dividend constituted a transaction defrauding creditors under section 423 of the UK’s Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986).

Background to the Sequana Case

What Is the "Rule in Gibbs"?

The rule in Gibbs is a long-established common law principle in which the Court of Appeal determined that a debt governed by English law cannot be discharged or compromised by a foreign insolvency proceeding(Anthony Gibbs and Sons v La Société Industrielle et Commerciale des Métaux (1890) 25 QBD 399). The rule in Gibbs remains a fundamental tenet of English insolvency law.

Why Does the Rule in Gibbs Matter?

In a brief but significant opinion, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware reversed a decision by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware and allowed more than $30 million in unsecured, post-petition fees incurred by an indenture trustee ("Indenture Trustee").1 In reversing, the District Court relied upon a uniform body of Court of Appeals opinions issued on the subject.

Does a creditor’s good-faith belief that a discharge injunction does not apply to its debt preclude a finding of civil contempt? Due to a circuit split, the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to decide this issue.

Are a licensee’s rights to use a trademark safe if the licensor files for bankruptcy and rejects the trademark license? This is a question the U.S. Supreme Court may resolve later this year.

Section 523(a)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a discharge under the Bankruptcy Code does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by use of a statement in writing that is materially false, respecting the debtor’s financial condition, on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable for such money, property, services, or credit reasonably relied, and that the debtor caused to be made or published with intent to deceive.

In Bakery and Confectionery Union Fund v. Just Born II, Inc., the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals on April 26, 2018, affirmed the district court’s judgment requiring Just Born to pay delinquent contributions into the Bakery and Confectionery Union and Industry International Pension Fund (the Pension Fund), as well as interest, statutory damages and attorneys’ fees.

Courts agree that bankruptcy trustees control bankrupt corporations' privilege – just as corporations' successor management controls privilege protection. But does the same approach apply in an individual's bankruptcy setting?

On October 20, 2017, in In re MPM Silicones, LLC ("Momentive"), Nos. 15-1682, 15-1771, 15-1824, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, considering the Supreme Court's opinion in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004), adopted the Sixth Circuit's two-step approach to determining an appropriate cramdown interest rate that, in certain circumstances, results in the application of a market rate of interest. In doing so, the Second Circuit reversed the bankruptcy and district court holdings on the cramdown interest rate issue.

In October 2017, the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, in In re MPM Silicones (Momentive) LLC, held that a non-consenting class of creditors is entitled to receive post-confirmation interest at a market rate if an efficient market exists to determine such a rate. In reaching its decision, the 2nd Circuit overruled prior decisions by the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court, which had held that the applicable rate of interest should be determined using the formula method adopted by the Supreme Court in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S.