On June 27, the U.S. Supreme Court announced a 5-4 decision rejecting the nonconsensual releases of the Sackler family in the Purdue Pharma bankruptcy case. The split is an interesting alignment of Justices: Gorsuch writing the majority opinion, joined by Thomas, Alito, Barrett and Jackson; Kavanaugh for the dissent, joined by Roberts, Sotomayor and Kagan.

Deal structure matters, particularly in bankruptcy. The Third Circuit recently ruled that a creditor’s right to future royalty payments in a non-executory contract could be discharged in the counterparty-debtor’s bankruptcy. The decision highlights the importance of properly structuring M&A, earn-out, and royalty-based transactions to ensure creditors receive the benefit of their bargain — even (or especially) if their counterparty later encounters financial distress.

Background

Chapter 11 bankruptcy has long been thought of as anathema to commercial real estate (CRE) lenders. This is due to the debtor-friendly bankruptcy forum, particularly with respect to (i) the up to 18 month exclusivity period during which only the debtor could propose a plan of reorganization and (ii) threats of a "cram-down" plan used to lever concessions from lenders. These provisions can be, and often were, abused by debtors with no real rehabilitative intent using bankruptcy only as a leverage tool.

The New York State Legislature recently proposed a bill, entitled the Sovereign Debt Stability Act, [1] intended to facilitate sovereign debt restructuring.

As you know from our prior alerts, creditors of borrowers formed as Delaware LLCs (as opposed to corporations) lack standing under Delaware law to sue directors for breaching fiduciary duties even when, to the surprise of many, the LLC is insolvent. See our prior Alert. The disparity of substantive creditor rights depending entirely on corporate form results from two aspects of Delaware law.

In early February, a Delaware bankruptcy judge set new precedent by granting a creditors’ committee derivative standing to pursue breach of fiduciary duty claims against a Delaware LLC’s members and officers. At least three prior Delaware Bankruptcy Court decisions had held that creditors were barred from pursuing such derivative claims by operation of Delaware state law, specifically under the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act (the “DLLCA”).

A Massachusetts Bankruptcy Court’s recent appellate decision in Blumsack v. Harrington (In re Blumsack) leaves the door open for those employed in the cannabis industry to seek bankruptcy relief where certain conditions are met.

There is a growing trend of bankruptcy courts approving structured dismissals of chapter 11 cases following a successful sale of a debtor’s assets under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. A structured dismissal is a cost‑effective way for a debtor to exit chapter 11 and is an alternative to (a) confirming a post‑sale liquidating plan, which is expensive and not always viable, or (b) converting the case to chapter 7, which introduces significant uncertainty and unpredictability with the appointment of a chapter 7 trustee to replace management.

It is a rare occasion that one can be assured with certainty that, if they file a motion with a bankruptcy court, it will be granted. But, in the Third Circuit, that is exactly what will happen if a creditor or other party in interest moves for an examiner to be appointed under Section 1104(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. Once considered to be within the discretion of a bankruptcy court “as is appropriate,” the appointment of an examiner is now guaranteed if the statutory predicates are fulfilled according to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

When leveraged buyouts (“LBOs”) fail, the selling shareholders are litigation targets. A common suit is a claim by a bankruptcy trustee asserting constructive fraudulent transfer claims seeking to claw-back payments to the selling shareholders from the loan proceeds that financed the LBO.