The Singapore High Court recently issued the first-ever super-priority order for debts arising from rescue financing under Section 211E(1)(b) of the amended insolvency laws in the Companies Act. The decision shows that the court is open to adopting relatively unique deal structures, and could be a benefit for more business-centric solutions.
In Part 1, we discussed how, despite widespread usage, termination in the event of bankruptcy clauses (“ipso facto” clauses) are generally unenforceable pursuant to the bankruptcy code. In this second part, we discuss why these clauses are still prevalent in commercial transactions and the exceptions that allow for enforceability in certain situations.
Why Do Ipso Facto Clauses Remain in Most Contracts?
If ipso facto clauses are generally not enforceable, then why do practically all commercial agreements continue to include them? There are several reasons.
Introduction
The UNCITRAL Model Law on the Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency Related Judgments (‘the New Model Law’) is intended to fill the gaps that currently exist in cross-border conventions as they apply to the recognition and enforcement of judgments in insolvency proceedings.
Practically all commercial transactions, including licenses, services agreements, and supply agreements, contain a provision that triggers termination rights, without notice, to a party whenever the other party files for bankruptcy or experiences other insolvency-related event. In Part 1 of a two-part series, we discuss how the commonly used termination-on-insolvency clauses are generally unenforceable despite their widespread use.
Standard Ipso Facto Provision
Khandanpour v Chambers [2019] EWCA Civ 570
Should relief from sanctions be granted where a judgment debtor purports to appropriate monies paid to satisfying a procedural condition for setting aside a default costs order, but the creditor purports to appropriate the monies instead to the judgment debt?
Background
How deep is the “pool of facts in which it is permissible to fish for the basis of the new cause of action” if a party wishes to benefit from the ‘relation back’ doctrine when calculating limitation periods? The Court of Appeal gives guidance on the meaning of “the same or substantially the same facts” for the purpose of CPR r 17.4(2).
With the Court of Appeal’s decision in Bresco Electrical Services Ltd v Michael J Lonsdale (Electrical) Ltd just a few weeks old, it is hardly surprising that people are looking again at the relationship between insolvency law and adjudication, noting that in cases of liquidation where parties have a cross claim, construction law defers to insolvency law.
This was clearly illustrated in Gregg Nowak Ltd v CSS Electrical Distributors Ltd, which came before HHJ Bailey earlier this month.
Background
This was a conjoined appeal alongside Bresco v Lonsdale. In this case, Cannon and Primus had already participated in an adjudication, with the decision of the adjudicator favouring Primus. Primus would later enter into a Company Voluntary Arrangement.
The CVA was made on the basis that, although Primus was insolvent at the time, it would be able to satisfy its creditors if it were able to recover from Cannon and other third parties through litigation and adjudication. This was preferable to liquidation.
Insolvency Set-Off and Construction Contract Adjudications in light of Bresco Electrical Services Ltd (in liquidation) v Michael J Lonsdale (electrical) Ltd; Cannon Corporate Ltd v Primus Build Ltd [2019] EWCA Civ 27