Introduction

Does the dissolution of a corporation that is in receivership terminate the receivership? Until the recent decision of Meta Energy Inc. v. Algatec Solarwerke Brandenberg GMBH, 2012 ONSC 175, 2012 ONSC 4873, there was no previous court decision directly on point. The answer to the question is “no.”

Background

A recent case illustrates the importance of clarity in the contractual arrangements associated with the disposition of a debtor’s assets. In the case, the Court appointed receiver was given Court approval for an auction services agreement. Under that agreement, the auctioneer was to conduct an auction sale of the debtor’s assets and was entitled to charge and collect a buyer’s premium equal to a minimum of 12% of the sales price.

Assenagon Asset Management S.A. v Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Limited (formerly Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Limited) [2012] EWHC 2090 (Ch)

The Court’s unanimous decision in RadLAX Gateway Hotel LLC v. Amalgamated Banksettles dispute over the credit-bid right, retaining this important creditor protection.

The common law has long recognized a secured creditor’s duty to provide reasonable notice to borrowers before enforcing its security and appointing a receiver. The practical importance of this has become less significant since the codification of the principle of reasonable notice in section 244 of theBankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”). However, in the recent case of Bank of Montreal v.

In the midst of the ongoing restructurings of Nortel and AbitibiBowater, the New Democrats introduced Bill C-501 in the spring of 2010 to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the “BIA”) and the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) with the goal of better protecting employees’ interests in the context of formal insolvency proceedings, including pension interests. However, Bill C-501 did not become law.

Introduction

In “True Lease v. Security Lease – Is the Distinction Still Relevant?” which appeared in the June 2008 issue of Collateral Matters, Jill Fraser discussed a 2007 amendment to the Personal Property Security Act (Ontario) (the “PPSA”) and whether or not the distinction between a true lease and a security lease was still relevant in light of that amendment.

In Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. ____ (June 23, 2011), the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the bankruptcy court could not, as a constitutional matter, enter a final judgment on a counterclaim that did not arise under Title 11 or in a case under Title 11, even though 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) expressly permits it to do so. In a dispute concerning the estate of the late J. Howard Marshall II, Pierce Marshall filed a complaint in Vickie Lynn Marshall’s bankruptcy case alleging that Vickie defamed him and that such defamation claim was not dischargeable.

Section 11.01 of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) states that no order under Section 11 or 11.02 of the CCAA has the effect of: (a) prohibiting a person from requiring immediate payment for goods, services, the use of leased or licensed property or other valuable consideration provided after the order is made; or (b) requiring the further advance of money or credit.

As most are aware by now, the Ontario Court of Appeal (the “OCA”) recently caused alarm by finding that claims of pension plan beneficiaries ranked higher than the super-priority debtor-in-possession financing charge (the “DIP Charge”) created by the amended initial order (the “CCAA Order”) in the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) proceedings of the Indalex group of Canadian companies (collectively, “Indalex”).