Liquidator remuneration in insolvency proceedings often raises difficult questions; especially in large corporate collapses where the work is extensive and the stakes are high. Courts must balance fair compensation with creditor protection, but approaches to fee assessment have varied across jurisdictions, leading to uncertainty and dispute.
When a company goes into liquidation, creditors often wonder whether they will recover their debts. One available option to achieve this is funding legal action to help the liquidator recover assets.
Singapore's insolvency legislation allows creditors who fund liquidators' recovery actions to have priority over other creditors in the distribution of recovered assets. This improves the viability of commencing insolvency proceedings as an asset recovery tool.
When a company enters liquidation, the appointed liquidator steps into a pivotal role – one that requires navigating complex challenges to recover assets and maximize returns for creditors. This task entails conducting detailed investigations and pursuing legal actions, processes that demand a careful balance of inquiry, judgment, and responsibility.
Asset freeze measures enacted by the United Kingdom against designated persons (DPs) can, under certain circumstances, extend to entities “owned or controlled” by DPs. To date, there have been few—and at times partly contradictory—English court cases addressing the “ownership and control” criteria under the UK sanctions regime. The latest judgment in Hellard v OJSC Rossiysky Kredit Bank sought to reconcile the previous guidance provided by the courts in the Mints and Litasco cases.
The US Supreme Court ruled in a landmark 5-4 decision on June 27, 2024 that nonconsensual third-party releases, as proposed in Purdue Pharma’s bankruptcy plan, were not permissible under the Bankruptcy Code. A nonconsensual third-party release serves to eliminate the direct claims of third parties against nondebtor parties without soliciting the consent of such affected claimants. This contrasts with consensual releases and opt-in or opt-out mechanisms permitted by courts.
The New York State Legislature recently proposed a bill, entitled the Sovereign Debt Stability Act, [1] intended to facilitate sovereign debt restructuring.
As you know from our prior alerts, creditors of borrowers formed as Delaware LLCs (as opposed to corporations) lack standing under Delaware law to sue directors for breaching fiduciary duties even when, to the surprise of many, the LLC is insolvent. See our prior Alert. The disparity of substantive creditor rights depending entirely on corporate form results from two aspects of Delaware law.
There is a growing trend of bankruptcy courts approving structured dismissals of chapter 11 cases following a successful sale of a debtor’s assets under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. A structured dismissal is a cost‑effective way for a debtor to exit chapter 11 and is an alternative to (a) confirming a post‑sale liquidating plan, which is expensive and not always viable, or (b) converting the case to chapter 7, which introduces significant uncertainty and unpredictability with the appointment of a chapter 7 trustee to replace management.
When leveraged buyouts (“LBOs”) fail, the selling shareholders are litigation targets. A common suit is a claim by a bankruptcy trustee asserting constructive fraudulent transfer claims seeking to claw-back payments to the selling shareholders from the loan proceeds that financed the LBO.
Bankruptcy Considerations for Unitranche Transactions with Super-Priority Revolvers without an AAL