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Asset freeze measures enacted by the United Kingdom against designated persons (DPs) can, under certain circumstances, extend to entities “owned or controlled” by DPs. To date, there have been few—and at times partly contradictory—English court cases addressing the “ownership and control” criteria under the UK sanctions regime. The latest judgment in Hellard v OJSC Rossiysky Kredit Bank sought to reconcile the previous guidance provided by the courts in the Mints and Litasco cases.

The US Supreme Court ruled in a landmark 5-4 decision on June 27, 2024 that nonconsensual third-party releases, as proposed in Purdue Pharma’s bankruptcy plan, were not permissible under the Bankruptcy Code. A nonconsensual third-party release serves to eliminate the direct claims of third parties against nondebtor parties without soliciting the consent of such affected claimants. This contrasts with consensual releases and opt-in or opt-out mechanisms permitted by courts.

Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code provides a valuable tool for non-US entities going through foreign insolvency proceedings when they have assets located in the United States. Chapter 15 can protect the value of US assets by granting a stay of actions against those assets during the concurrent administration of a complementary US insolvency process with that of the original foreign insolvency proceeding.

One of the primary goals of bankruptcy law is to provide debtors with a fresh start by imposing an automatic stay and allowing for claims of reorganizing debtors to be discharged. In environmental law, a primary goal is to ensure that the “polluter pays” for environmental harms. These two goals collide when an entity with environmental liabilities enters bankruptcy. The result is often outcomes that are the exception, rather than the rule, with many unsettled areas of law that can be dealt with by bankruptcy courts in varying ways.

Can a debtor reinstate a defaulted loan under a Chapter 11 plan without paying default rate interest? This question was analyzed thoroughly in a recent Southern District of New York Bankruptcy Court decision by Judge Philip Bentley.

In a decision likely to have a knock-on effect for future fraudulent transfer defense and valuation litigation, the Delaware bankruptcy court recently ruled that the price agreed in the sale of an oil and gas company closed by market participants represents the reasonably equivalent value for the assets being sold and is more reliable evidence of value than expert testimony prepared for the purposes of litigation.

In the wake of several high-profile collapses of cryptocurrency exchanges, most notably FTX, Celsius, and Voyager, the state of the digital asset landscape is ever-changing, with more questions and landmines than clear paths forward. Among the many issues that arise in these bankruptcy cases is the question of how to treat and classify digital assets, especially cryptocurrencies—e.g., who owns the cryptocurrencies deposited by customers.

In In re CII Parent, Inc.,1 the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware affirmed a secured lender’s prepetition exercise of its proxy rights and its subsequent removal and replacement of the directors/managers of the debtor’s non-bankrupt subsidiaries, effectively cutting off the debtor’s ability to pursue effective relief in the bankruptcy case.

US governmental authorities, including the US Department of the Treasury, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, took actions to provide both insured and uninsured depositors of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) (as well as Signature Bank) access to their deposits beginning Monday, March 13. However, despite these actions, many customers are still dealing with the aftermath of an uncertain weekend, and practical questions remain to be answered.

It may be fair to say that non-US entities involved in a chapter 15 case, the mechanism through which US courts recognize foreign insolvency proceedings, do not anticipate having to litigate claims raised in the chapter 15 case outside of the bankruptcy court. This may be due in large part to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1), an abstention statute applicable in chapter 15 bankruptcy proceedings.