Fulltext Search

On June 7, 2019, Judge Dennis Montali of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court of the Northern District of California San Francisco Division found that FERC’s finding that it had concurrent jurisdiction with the U.S. bankruptcy court over wholesale power agreements was “unenforceable in bankruptcy court and of no force on the parties before it.” Judge Montali further noted that if necessary, the U.S. bankruptcy court will “enjoin FERC from perpetuating its attempt to exercise power it wholly lacks.” At issue, on review by the bankruptcy court, was whether, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

In Witt v. United Cos. Lending Corp. (“In re Witt”), 113 F.3d 508 (4th Cir. 1997), the Fourth Circuit held that Chapter 13 debtors are not permitted to bifurcate undersecured home mortgage loans into separate secured and unsecured claims. In re Witt, 113 F.3d at 509. Recently, the Court overruled this twenty-two-year-old decision in an en banc opinion, Hurlburt v. Black, No. 17-2449, 2019 WL 2237966 (4th Cir. 2019).

In preparing a merchant cash advance (MCA) agreement on behalf of the provider, there is constant tension between the urge to include every conceivable contractual right for protecting the provider’s economic interests and the need to avoid language that might reorder the parties’ relationship in a way that renders the entire agreement unenforceable. Deciding how to address the possibility that the merchant might pursue bankruptcy poses a particularly challenging dilemma.

It is well settled that the purpose of filing a bankruptcy petition is to “give[] the honest but unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt.” Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, (1934). A debtor’s discharge in bankruptcy, and the corresponding injunction provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, are the two primary elements that effectuate this financial fresh start.Chapman v. Bituminous Ins. Co. (In re Coho Res., Inc.), 345 F.3d 338, 342 (5th Cir. 2003).

The Singapore High Court recently issued the first-ever super-priority order for debts arising from rescue financing under Section 211E(1)(b) of the amended insolvency laws in the Companies Act. The decision shows that the court is open to adopting relatively unique deal structures, and could be a benefit for more business-centric solutions.

In Part 1, we discussed how, despite widespread usage, termination in the event of bankruptcy clauses (“ipso facto” clauses) are generally unenforceable pursuant to the bankruptcy code. In this second part, we discuss why these clauses are still prevalent in commercial transactions and the exceptions that allow for enforceability in certain situations.

Why Do Ipso Facto Clauses Remain in Most Contracts?

If ipso facto clauses are generally not enforceable, then why do practically all commercial agreements continue to include them? There are several reasons.

On April 29, New Jersey’s governor signed into law bill A4997, known as the Mortgage Servicers Licensing Act. As the title indicates, the Act creates a licensing regime for servicers of residential mortgage loans secured by real property within New Jersey. As with many state licensing regimes, the Act exempts most banks and credit unions from licensing.

Even under the most sympathetic of circumstances, courts are charged with respecting the integrity of deadlines and employing a cool, impartial approach to everyone, including the most desperate of late claimants.

Practically all commercial transactions, including licenses, services agreements, and supply agreements, contain a provision that triggers termination rights, without notice, to a party whenever the other party files for bankruptcy or experiences other insolvency-related event. In Part 1 of a two-part series, we discuss how the commonly used termination-on-insolvency clauses are generally unenforceable despite their widespread use.

Standard Ipso Facto Provision