The United States Supreme Court recently held that a creditor who files a bankruptcy claim on a time-barred debt does not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). SeeMidland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017). In the case, the debtor filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, and the creditor filed a proof of claim asserting that it was owed credit card debt. However, the credit card had not been used in over ten years, outside Alabama’s six-year statute of limitations.
This week, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 581 U.S. ___ (2017), holding that a debt collector does not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by filing an “obviously time-barred” proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding. This case should stem the tide of FDCPA lawsuits against debt collectors for efforts to collect potentially time-barred debts in bankruptcy proceedings.
On May 15, 2017, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 581 U.S. ___ (2017) in which it held that filing an “obviously time-barred” proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding does not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey recently overruled a creditor’s objection to the debtors’ proposed chapter 13 plan, rejecting the association’s argument that its claim is secured by a consensual lien and may not be modified pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 1322(b)(2). Specifically, the Court found that a lien held by a New Jersey condominium or homeowners’ association can be either a statutory lien (subject to modification) or a consensual lien (not subject to modification) depending upon the circumstances presented. In re Keise, 564 B.R. 255 (Bankr. D.N.J.
The United States District Court for the Western District of New York recently granted defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s first cause of action alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. (“FDCPA”), on the ground that plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead that the communications from defendant were sent in an attempt to collect a debt. SeeBurns v. Seterus, Inc., 2017 WL 104735 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2017). In 2005, plaintiff signed a note and mortgage secured by her residence.
The Ninth Circuit recently ruled that a Chapter 11 debtor could not avoid the payment of default interest under a promissory note as a condition to curing and reinstating such promissory note under a Chapter 11 plan. In Pacifica L 51 LLC v. New Investments Inc. (In re New Investments, Inc.), 840 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2016), the Ninth Circuit held that its prior rule of allowing a curing debtor to avoid a contractual post-default interest rate in a loan agreement—as decided in Great Western Bank & Trust v.
The First Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel recently issued a decision recognizing the rights of trademark licensees when the trademark’s owner files for bankruptcy.
Attributable to Amanda Remus, spokeswoman for Irving H. Picard, SIPA Trustee for the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (BLMIS) and his counsel:
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York today approved the SIPA Trustee's request for an allocation of approximately $342 million in recoveries to the BLMIS Customer Fund and has authorized the SIPA Trustee to proceed with the eighth pro rata interim distribution from the Customer Fund to BLMIS customers with allowed claims.
The Fourth Circuit recently affirmed a bankruptcy court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) claims, holding that the defendant’s conduct—filing proofs of claim based on time-barred debts—does not violate the FDCPA. SeeIn re Dubois, 2016 WL4474156 (4th Cir. Aug. 25, 2016). In the case, each of the two plaintiffs filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, and the defendant filed proofs of claim in the plaintiffs’ cases.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently reaffirmed that a foreclosure action commenced more than six years after the loan was accelerated could still be within the applicable statute of limitations. SeeIn re: Gordon Allen Washington; Gordon Allen Washington v. Bank of New York Mellon, As Tr. for the Certificate-Holders of the CWABS, Inc., Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2007-5, 2016 WL 5827439 (3d Cir. Sept. 30, 2016). In the case, the borrowed executed a mortgage and promissory note in February 2007.