Seafood Shack Ltd v Alan Darlow [2019] EWHC 1567 (Ch)

A lease of restaurant premises was granted to a company that did not exist; there was no legal basis for correcting the lease, and the similarly-named company claiming rights was held to have none.

An IRA owner could not rely on a Florida exemption to shield his IRA account from creditors after engaging in prohibited acts of self-dealing with his IRA funds, the Eleventh Circuit held in Yerian v. Webber, 2019 WL 2610751 (11th Cir. June 26, 2019). The IRA owner, Keith Yerian, opened a self-directed IRA. The IRA was governed by two contracts.

On May 20, 2019, the US Supreme Court clarified that when a trademark licensor rejects a trademark license agreement in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding, the rejection does not rescind the use rights of the licensee under the license agreement. The decision resolved a circuit split on this issue between the First and Seventh Circuits. The Court held that the licensor’s rejection of the license agreement in bankruptcy has the same effect on the licensee’s rights as a licensor’s breach of the license agreement outside of bankruptcy.

In February, following oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court in Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, we wrote about the hugely important trademark law issue presented by this case, namely: If a bankrupt trademark licensor “rejects” an executory trademark license agreement, does that bankruptcy action terminate the licensee’s right to continue using the licensed trademark for the remaining term of the agreement?

Oral argument before the Supreme Court was held on February 20 in the much-watched and even more intensely discussed trademark dispute Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC. The case presents the difficult and multifaceted question: Does bankruptcy law insulate the right of a trademark licensee to continue using the licensed mark despite the bankrupt trademark licensor’s decision to “reject” the remaining term of the trademark license?

On July 19, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals entered a decision upholding the results of a foreclosure sale against a debtor’s allegation that the sale was a preference because the bankruptcy estate could have sold the property for a higher price. Veltre v. Fifth Third Bank (In re Veltre), Case No. 17-2889 (3d Cir. July 19, 2018).

(Excerpted from “Retail Bankruptcies – Protections for Landlords,” Practical Law Journal, May 2018, by Lars Fuller)

Due to increasing competition from online sellers, recent years have seen a dramatic uptick in Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings by multistate brick-and-mortar retailers – some that have dozens, or even hundreds, of storefronts. These bankruptcies create challenges for the commercial landlords that own the shopping centers, malls and other establishments that those retailers rented.

Ground leases are fairly common but sometimes overlooked property interests. A succinct but adequate definition of a ground lease was articulated by Herbert Thorndike Tiffany (Tiffany on Real Property § 85.50 [3d ed.]) as follows:

The Supreme Court held that a statement about a single asset can be a “statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition” for purposes of determining the application of the exception to discharge set forth in Section 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. Lamar, Archer & Cofrin LLP v. Appling, 2018 WL 2465174 (June 4, 2018).

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Merit Mgmt. Group, LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S.Ct. 883 (2018), held that transfers made by and to entities that are not “financial institutions” or other covered entities fall outside of the scope of the § 546(e) safe harbor even if they are made through financial institutions or other covered entities. The Supreme Court’s decision resolves a circuit split over how the § 546(e) safe harbor applies to transactions involving conduit entities and could impact future disputes involving safe harbors under the Bankruptcy Code.