"The Parent Bank entered into this insurance contract with its eyes wide open and its wallet on its mind."

The Supreme Court of the United States inMidland v. Johnson reversed the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and held that a debt collector that files a proof of claim for debt that is barred by the applicable statute of limitations does not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) if the face of the proof of claim makes clear that the statute of limitations has run. The Supreme Court refused to accept the debtor's argument that Midland's proof of claim was "false, deceptive, or misleading" under the FDCPA.

This week, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 581 U.S. ___ (2017), holding that a debt collector does not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by filing an “obviously time-barred” proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding. This case should stem the tide of FDCPA lawsuits against debt collectors for efforts to collect potentially time-barred debts in bankruptcy proceedings.

On May 15, 2017, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 581 U.S. ___ (2017) in which it held that filing an “obviously time-barred” proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding does not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).

In two recent decisions, both the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Fourth Circuit) and the Fifth Circuit (Fifth Circuit) concluded that certain orders entered in bankruptcy cases could not be grounds for invocation of res judicata with regard to proofs of claim that are deemed allowed. Both addressed the plain language of Section 502(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the Code) in conjunction with relevant Bankruptcy Rules and Official Forms, and congressional intent.

On March 9, 2017, a bankruptcy court in New York became the latest to weigh in on the developing circuit court split regarding whether modification of mortgages should be permitted under 11 U.S.C.

The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts (the District Court) recently issued an opinion in the Paul Sagendorph bankruptcy case reversing the Bankruptcy Court's holding that a debtor can force a secured creditor to take title to its collateral in complete satisfaction of the creditor's secured claim.1 In reversing the decision of the Bankruptcy Court, the District Court held that the plain language of Sections 1322(b)(9) and 1325(a)(5)(C)2 does not empower a debtor to force a secured creditor to accept title to its collateral over that creditor's objection.3

The Ninth Circuit recently ruled that a Chapter 11 debtor could not avoid the payment of default interest under a promissory note as a condition to curing and reinstating such promissory note under a Chapter 11 plan. In Pacifica L 51 LLC v. New Investments Inc. (In re New Investments, Inc.), 840 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2016), the Ninth Circuit held that its prior rule of allowing a curing debtor to avoid a contractual post-default interest rate in a loan agreement—as decided in Great Western Bank & Trust v.

The First Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel recently issued a decision recognizing the rights of trademark licensees when the trademark’s owner files for bankruptcy.

Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act (the "TIA") states the right of a bondholder to receive payments pursuant to an indenture security cannot be "impaired or affected without the consent of such holder." Historically, issuers and bondholders have not engaged in extensive litigation based on the argument that Section 316(b) provides a broad restriction protecting bondholders' substantive right to actually receive such payments.