The latest amendments to the Kazakhstan Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Law were signed on April 2, 2019, and became effective from April 14. The amendments enhance the priority right of secured creditors through the acceptance of pledged assets in kind or the implementation of self-facilitated foreclosure over pledged assets. Notably, the law provides that pledged assets are carved out from bankruptcy estates.

Priority of Claims of Secured Creditors

To exercise a priority right, a secured creditor must comply with the following procedure:

The UK government has published a draft Finance Bill 2020, which includes a provision that, if enacted, will give HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) secondary preferential creditor status for certain taxes which a company has collected but failed to pay to HMRC on the date it enters insolvency.

New Priority Status

Directors and officers of private companies are responsible for managing and running business. This responsibility is not limited to disciplinary liability (such as termination of employment), but also involves civil law liability (such as payment of damages) as well as administrative and even criminal liability. In some cases, the liability may be broad and contain no reasonable exceptions that might be available in other jurisdictions. This LawFlash summarizes the extent of liability that company directors and officers could face under Kazakhstan law.

When a business entity that is regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is closely related to another business entity, FERC takes the position that under some circumstances it may treat the two different legal entities as if they were one single entity.

The Singapore High Court recently issued the first-ever super-priority order for debts arising from rescue financing under Section 211E(1)(b) of the amended insolvency laws in the Companies Act. The decision shows that the court is open to adopting relatively unique deal structures, and could be a benefit for more business-centric solutions.

In February, following oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court in Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, we wrote about the hugely important trademark law issue presented by this case, namely: If a bankrupt trademark licensor “rejects” an executory trademark license agreement, does that bankruptcy action terminate the licensee’s right to continue using the licensed trademark for the remaining term of the agreement?

In Part 1, we discussed how, despite widespread usage, termination in the event of bankruptcy clauses (“ipso facto” clauses) are generally unenforceable pursuant to the bankruptcy code. In this second part, we discuss why these clauses are still prevalent in commercial transactions and the exceptions that allow for enforceability in certain situations.

Why Do Ipso Facto Clauses Remain in Most Contracts?

If ipso facto clauses are generally not enforceable, then why do practically all commercial agreements continue to include them? There are several reasons.

Practically all commercial transactions, including licenses, services agreements, and supply agreements, contain a provision that triggers termination rights, without notice, to a party whenever the other party files for bankruptcy or experiences other insolvency-related event. In Part 1 of a two-part series, we discuss how the commonly used termination-on-insolvency clauses are generally unenforceable despite their widespread use.

Standard Ipso Facto Provision

Oral argument before the Supreme Court was held on February 20 in the much-watched and even more intensely discussed trademark dispute Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC. The case presents the difficult and multifaceted question: Does bankruptcy law insulate the right of a trademark licensee to continue using the licensed mark despite the bankrupt trademark licensor’s decision to “reject” the remaining term of the trademark license?

On July 19, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals entered a decision upholding the results of a foreclosure sale against a debtor’s allegation that the sale was a preference because the bankruptcy estate could have sold the property for a higher price. Veltre v. Fifth Third Bank (In re Veltre), Case No. 17-2889 (3d Cir. July 19, 2018).