We discussed in the March 2020 edition of the Texas Bar Journal¹ the bankruptcy court ruling by Judge Craig A. Gargotta of San Antonio in In Re First River Energy LLC that oil and gas producers in Texas do not hold perfected security interests in oil and gas well proceeds, notwithstanding the Texas Legislature’s efforts to protect producers and royalty owners following the downturn in the 1980s. The Fifth Circuit recently reaffirmed Judge Gargotta’s decision.

This article sets out some reflections on the decision of the Supreme Court in Sevilleja v Marex Financial Limited [2020] UKSC 31 from July 2020 which clarifies the scope of the so-called ‘reflective loss’ rule. The first instance judgment raised some comment-worthy issues regarding the economic torts which were not the subject of any appeal.

The High Court has recently struck out proceedings against a defaulting debtor where the bank made a unilateral commercial decision to delay to allow her co-debtor to recover financially so increasing its prospect of recovery.

Background

In Bank of Ireland v Wilson,¹ the bank commenced summary proceedings against the defaulting debtors in 2012. The debtors, who were jointly and severally liable on the debt, had been in a relationship but were now estranged.

When a business becomes insolvent, all of the creditors of the business are at risk, including its landlords. As COVID-19 continues to challenge businesses in Ireland and abroad, two recent decisions of Mr Justice McDonald in the High Court offer a timely reminder of the standards which tenants must meet when seeking to compromise their commercial lease obligations and the importance of procedural fairness for landlords affected by tenant insolvency.

The New Look case¹

The Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (“CIGA”), which came into force on 26 June 2020, introduced a series of new “debtor friendly” procedures and measures to give companies the breathing space and tools required to maximize their chance of survival. The main insolvency related reforms in CIGA (which incorporates both permanent and temporary changes to the UK’s laws) include:

1. New moratorium to give companies breathing space from their creditors

2. Prohibition on termination of contracts for the supply of goods and services by reason of insolvency

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (the “Sixth Circuit”), whose jurisdiction includes Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee, recently held that, under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor’s pre-petition and certain post-petition voluntary retirement contributions are excludable from the debtor’s disposable income, which is used to satisfy a debtor’s obligations to its unsecured creditors.

Landlord and tenant relationships are likely to come under strain as tenants experience financial difficulties due to the COVID-19 pandemic. For tenant companies such financial difficulties may result in a tenant being placed in examinership, or ultimately in the appointment of a liquidator or receiver. An insolvency event generally constitutes an event of default in a commercial lease.

A company incorporated under the Companies Act has its own legal personality and can institute legal proceedings in its own name. However, difficulties can arise where proceedings are commenced on behalf of a company where this has not been properly authorised by the company. In addition, where a company is a party to proceedings, in the absence of certain limited exceptions, it must retain legal representation to act on its behalf.

Authority to Institute Proceedings

Directors of the Company

McCann FitzGerald acted for the Asia Pulp and Paper Group (“APP Group”) in the recent successful restructuring of over US$1 billion of debt.

In a first for the Irish restructuring market, the debt was restructured through a scheme of arrangement under section 676 of Part 11 of the Companies Act 2014 (“Part 11 Scheme of Arrangement”). On 23 October 2019, the US Bankruptcy Court granted recognition of the scheme under Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code.

On May 20, 2019, the Supreme Court settled a circuit split concerning whether a debtor’s rejection of a trademark license under § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code “deprives the licensee of its rights to use the trademark.” In a decision written by Justice Kagan, the Supreme Court held that while a debtor-licensor’s rejection of a trademark license results in a pre-petition breach, it does not constitute a rescission of the contract, and thus the licensee may retain the rights granted to it under the license.