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Buying natural gas assets from financially distressed companies is an inherently risky proposition.  Even when an attractive prospect is identified, the purchaser has to overcome a number of issues such as clearing up title, including mechanic and materialman liens and getting assignments of contracts and lessor consents.  Assuming these hurdles can be managed, the purchaser is also faced with legacy liability problems ranging from plugging and abandonment and decommissioning costs, unknown claims from interest owners under joint operating agreements, general claims from oil field

Technological innovation has changed the landscape of domestic natural gas production from shortage to surplus. The result: a glut of natural gas and historically low prices. While many producers have successfully hedged against this risk to date, as older hedges roll off, many companies are unable to obtain replacement hedges at attractive prices. Some have even resorted to monetizing their in-the-money hedges to raise capital today (and borrowing against the future).

It is looking increasingly likely that 2012 will be another difficult year for the automotive sector, leading to a decline, not only in vehicle sales, but also in goods and services supplied to the sector. As a result, businesses may experience cash flow problems and increased creditor pressure to pay invoices.

We previously reported on Raithatha v Williamson (4 April 2012) where the High Court held that a bankrupt’s right to draw a pension was subject to an income payments order (“IPO”) even if the individual had yet to draw his pension. This judgment represented a significant departure from previous practice under the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 which protected future pension rights from IPOs and distinguished them from pensions in payment. It also effectively allowed a trustee in bankruptcy to compel a bankrupt to draw pension against his wishes.

The EU insolvency law has resulted in insolvent debtors shopping for a better jurisdiction in which to become bankrupt.  This article examines why and how.

Why?

The EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings 2000 (the ECIR), came into effect in May 2002, providing a framework for the national jurisdictions to work together by recognition of each states insolvency mechanisms.  However the EC Regulation does not harmonise substantive differences in insolvency law between the subscribing nations.

Regulation 7 of TUPE states that a dismissal will be automatically unfair if the main reason for dismissal is the transfer itself, or a reason connected with the transfer that is not an economic, technical or organisational reason entailing changes in the workforce (‘ETO reason’). This provision has caused some uncertainty where employees are dismissed by an administrator in order to make a business more attractive to a prospective (but as yet unknown) purchaser.

The TUPE Regulations contain some provisions designed to make struggling businesses more attractive to prospective purchasers. TUPE will not apply to transfer employees, and dismissals will not be automatically unfair, where insolvency proceedings have been instituted with a view to liquidation of assets (Regulation 8(7)). However, TUPE will apply to insolvency proceedings which do not aim to liquidate assets, and employees will have unfair dismissal protection (Regulation 8(8)).

The Issue

The issue is whether a Chapter 11 plan can be crammed down over the secured lender’s objection where the plan provides for the sale or transfer of the secured lender’s collateral with the proceeds going to the secured lender without the secured lender having the right to credit bid for is collateral up to the full amount of its claim.