Like the wild prairie rose that punctuates the North Dakota plains, the issue of whether a debtor can reject its midstream agreements is back after a brief period of dormancy. In Hot Topics in Oil and Gas Restructurings, Volume 3, we described how the U.S.

On November 17, 2016, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion holding that claims for “make-whole” amounts were valid and enforceable as “redemption premiums” under New York law despite the automatic acceleration of the underlying debt upon the issuer filing for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. See In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., No. 16-1351 (3d Cir. Nov. 17, 2016) (the “EFH Decision”).

Some term loans allow borrowers to redeem debt. But to protect a lender’s expected yield, such loans often impose a “make-whole premium” on redemption. That is, they require compensation to the lender for the borrower’s premature termination of interest payments.

In our previous two news alerts,1 we examined decisions that potentially undermine key elements of the legal structures that lenders created in response to their experiences in the United States Bankruptcy Courts during the real estate downturn of 1988 through 1992, including the involuntary restructure of their indebtedness and liens under the cram-down provisions of title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Codeâ€).

As a service to energy industry participants, the lawyers of the Oilfield Services and Bankruptcy Practices at Haynes and Boone, LLP have been tracking and reporting industry developments in oilfield service restructurings. Our research includes details on 100 bankruptcies filed since the beginning of 2015, including secured and unsecured debt totals for each case. The total amount of aggregate debt administered in oilfield services bankruptcy cases in 2015- 2016 is more than $14 billion and the average debt of these cases exceeds $144 million.

I. Introduction

The enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which ended the many tax shelter advantages previously available to real estate investors, coupled with the savings and loan crises, effectively collapsed the real estate boom of the early-to-mid 1980’s. From 1988 to 1993, countless numbers of real estate loans went into default and many real estate borrowers sought to involuntarily restructure their loans through the “cram-down” provisions of Chapter 11 under title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”). 

A Delaware bankruptcy court has joined what appears to be a recent trend toward invalidating limited liability company operating agreement provisions that effectively afford lenders veto power over the LLC’s authority to file for bankruptcy protection; the court found one such provision void as contrary to federal public policy. In re Intervention Energy Holdings, LLC, et al., Case No. 16-11247 (KJC) (D.I. 69), 2016 W.L. ___________ (Bankr. D. Del. June 3, 2016).

In most financing transactions, particularly project finance transactions, lenders seek to obtain security over all of a borrower’s assets. One crucial asset that sometimes does not get sufficient attention is insurance proceeds. Lenders are accustomed to ensuring access to the borrower’s insurance coverage through “additional insured” or “loss payee” provisions.

Yes, Gathering Agreements Can Be Rejected as Executory Contracts (At Least Under One Court’s Interpretation of Texas Law)