I. Introduction

The enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which ended the many tax shelter advantages previously available to real estate investors, coupled with the savings and loan crises, effectively collapsed the real estate boom of the early-to-mid 1980’s. From 1988 to 1993, countless numbers of real estate loans went into default and many real estate borrowers sought to involuntarily restructure their loans through the “cram-down” provisions of Chapter 11 under title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”). 

The Bankruptcy Code permits a bankruptcy trustee to compel return of a payment made to a creditor within 90 days before a bankruptcy petition. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A). The justification for compelling the return of preference payments is to level the playing field among creditors by not rewarding those who, perhaps, pressed the debtor the hardest on the eve of bankruptcy.

In most financing transactions, particularly project finance transactions, lenders seek to obtain security over all of a borrower’s assets. One crucial asset that sometimes does not get sufficient attention is insurance proceeds. Lenders are accustomed to ensuring access to the borrower’s insurance coverage through “additional insured” or “loss payee” provisions.

On May 16, 2016 the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion regarding the meaning of “actual fraud” under the Bankruptcy Code. Husky Int’l Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz represents a win for creditors by making it easier to show that a debtor committed fraud. A showing of a more general fraud, as opposed to a specific false representation by the debtor, will suffice to prevent certain debts from being discharged in bankruptcy.

Background

Nearly every day a different E&P company makes an announcement that indicates the company is facing financial distress, insolvency or bankruptcy.  Many of these companies are Operators under Joint Operating Agreements and with each announcement there are likely Non-Operators concerned about the impact these events will have on their non-operated working interests.  Non-Operators should understand their JOA rights and options when their Operator becomes distressed.

On remand by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, the Federal District Court of Massachusetts found Sun Capital Partners III, LP (“Sun Fund III”) and Sun Capital Partners IV, LP (“Sun Fund IV, and together with Sun Fund III, the “Sun Funds”) liable for the withdrawal liability of Scott Brass, Inc.

This alert describes certain information regarding the recently filed bankruptcy case of Emerald Oil, Inc. and is an example of current developments in the energy industry.

Emerald Oil, Inc. and its subsidiaries (collectively referred to as the “Debtors”) filed voluntary petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code on March 22, 2016 in the District of Delaware, pursuant to which the Debtors plan to sell substantially all of their assets (the “Assets”) in a possible auction in July 2016.

With the steep collapse of oil and gas prices in the last eighteen months, dozens of exploration and production companies have declared bankruptcy and many more companies are expected to file for bankruptcy protection unless prices rebound dramatically. As the prospect of further bankruptcies looms, it is important for parties to understand how to adequately protect their security interests and the nature of competing liens that could prevent them from fully realizing on the value of the collateral securing their counterparty’s obligations.

Equitable subordination in bankruptcy can be a powerful tool, providing a court with considerable latitude to set things right insofar as the estates of the penniless and the rights of their creditors are concerned.