ICC Judge Burton’s judgment in Dale & Ors v BDO LLP (Re NMCN PLC and NMCN Sustainable Solutions Ltd) [2025] EWHC 446 (Ch) follows an administrators’ application under ss 235 and 236 Insolvency Act 1986 for the former company auditors, BDO LLP, to deliver up audit files for 2018 and 2019 to enable the administrators to investigate whether BDO had breached duties owed to the companies. The application was resisted. The points of contention were:

(1) whether, as the companies’ auditors, BDO were an “officer” for the purposes of s 235;

The judgement of Hodge Malek KC, sitting as a deputy High Court judge, in Marko Ventures Ltd v London Antiaging Clinic Ltd [2025] EWHC 340 (Ch) deals with a contested application for an administration order under para 12(1)(c) Sch B1 Insolvency Act 1986. The order appointing joint administrators was sought in respect of London Antiaging Clinic Ltd by Marko Ventures Ltd, the majority shareholder in and principal funder of the company, which runs a health, beauty and wellbeing clinic in London.

On 26 February 2025, Deputy Master Scher handed down judgment in the case Suman Bhatia v Christopher Purkiss, as liquidator of JD Group Limited [2025] EWHC 359 (Ch). Wedlake Bell LLP (partner Edward Saunders), and Nora Wannagat (Tanfield Chambers) acted for the successful liquidator.

A copy of the judgment is available here.

Background

Starting life as a market trader, Balvinder Shergill went on to run a number of companies, mostly in the furniture business. Two of his early companies used the trading style Houghton Furnishing. After they stopped doing business, Mr Shergill went on to become involved as a director in five other companies.

Section 216 Insolvency Act 1986 provides that a person who has been a director of a company at any time in the 12 months before it goes into insolvent liquidation is prohibited for five years from being a director of, or directly or indirectly being concerned in or taking part in, the promotion, formation or management of a company with the same or similar name to the liquidated company (a “prohibited name”). Section 217 imposes personal liability on a director for debts incurred by a company which acts in breach of s 216.

The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois issued a noteworthy opinion for those whose work involves real estate mortgage conduit trusts (REMIC trusts) or utilization of the Bankruptcy Code’s “safe harbor” provisions. In In re MCK Millennium Ctr. Parking, LLC,¹ Bankruptcy Judge Jacqueline P.

Bankruptcy Judge Christopher S. Sontchi recently ruled in the Energy Future Holdings case¹ that the debtor will not be required to pay the $431 million “make whole” demanded by bondholders upon the debtor’s early payment of the bonds.²

In what may become viewed as the de facto standard for selling customer information in bankruptcies, a Delaware bankruptcy court approved, on May 20, 2015, a multi-party agreement that would substantially limit RadioShack’s ability to sell 117 million customer records.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wellness International Network Ltd. v. Sharif confirms the long-held and common sense belief that “knowing and voluntary consent” is the key to the exercise of judicial authority by a bankruptcy court judge.1 In short, the Supreme Court held that a litigant in a bankruptcy court can consent—expressly or impliedly through waiver—to the bankruptcy court’s final adjudication of claims that the bankruptcy court otherwise lacks constitutional authority to finally decide.

On May 6, 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether so-called“Deprizio waivers,”¹ where an insider guarantor waives indemnification rights against a debtor, can insulate the guarantor from preference liability arising from payments made by the obligor to the lender. The Ninth Circuit held that if such a waiver is made legitimately—not merely to avoid preference liability—then the guarantor is not a “creditor” and cannot be subject to preference liability.