Summary: In EPC Constructions India Ltd. v. Matix Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd., the Supreme Court addressed whether holders of non-cumulative redeemable preference shares can initiate insolvency proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC, as financial creditors. The Court held that preference shareholders are not creditors and cannot trigger insolvency proceedings, as preference shares remain part of the share capital even upon maturity, and conversion of debt into preference shares permanently extinguishes the original creditor relationship.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”), was enacted to inter alia provide a consolidated framework to resolve insolvency in a time-bound manner and to maximise the value of assets. This objective is further aided by a moratorium under Section 14 that halts legal proceedings against the corporate debtor, and the immunity provision under Section 32A, which offers a fresh slate to resolution applicants upon plan approval.

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“Code”), has marked a significant shift in India’s corporate insolvency landscape, transitioning from a debtor-centric approach to a creditor-centric approach. With the committee of creditors (“CoC”) now driving the resolution process, it has become imperative for “related parties”, likely to sabotage the resolution process of a corporate debtor, to be excluded from the same.

The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (“NCLAT”), has clarified and resolved the ambiguity surrounding the question of jurisdiction of the National Company Law Tribunal (“NCLT”) to entertain insolvency applications against personal guarantors where no corporate insolvency resolution process (“CIRP”) is pending against the corporate debtor. The issue was addressed through a recent judgment dated January 23, 2025, in Anita Goyal vs. Vistra ITCL (India) Ltd.

Recently, in State Bank of India v. India Power Corporation Ltd., Civil Appeal 10424 of 2024, the Hon’ble Supreme Court adjudicated upon the issue of certified copy of Order that is filed along with the appeal. 

The Hon’ble Supreme Court analysed several provisions of NCLT Rules and NCLAT Rules and held as follows:

i) Both the certified copy submitted free of cost as well as the certified copy which is made available on payment of cost are treated as “certified copies” for the purpose of Rule 50 of NCLT Rules.

The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois issued a noteworthy opinion for those whose work involves real estate mortgage conduit trusts (REMIC trusts) or utilization of the Bankruptcy Code’s “safe harbor” provisions. In In re MCK Millennium Ctr. Parking, LLC,¹ Bankruptcy Judge Jacqueline P.

Bankruptcy Judge Christopher S. Sontchi recently ruled in the Energy Future Holdings case¹ that the debtor will not be required to pay the $431 million “make whole” demanded by bondholders upon the debtor’s early payment of the bonds.²

In what may become viewed as the de facto standard for selling customer information in bankruptcies, a Delaware bankruptcy court approved, on May 20, 2015, a multi-party agreement that would substantially limit RadioShack’s ability to sell 117 million customer records.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wellness International Network Ltd. v. Sharif confirms the long-held and common sense belief that “knowing and voluntary consent” is the key to the exercise of judicial authority by a bankruptcy court judge.1 In short, the Supreme Court held that a litigant in a bankruptcy court can consent—expressly or impliedly through waiver—to the bankruptcy court’s final adjudication of claims that the bankruptcy court otherwise lacks constitutional authority to finally decide.

On May 6, 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether so-called“Deprizio waivers,”¹ where an insider guarantor waives indemnification rights against a debtor, can insulate the guarantor from preference liability arising from payments made by the obligor to the lender. The Ninth Circuit held that if such a waiver is made legitimately—not merely to avoid preference liability—then the guarantor is not a “creditor” and cannot be subject to preference liability.