Usually, a Fixed Charge Receiver will not be liable to pay business rates. However, there are some exceptions and in some important areas the law is unclear.

Occupied Property: Limited Exposure

To be liable for business rates a party must be in occupation of the Property. This is a matter of fact and degree. Generally, the position is clear although there can be issues for example where more than one party is entitled to occupation.

Recent legislative reform in the water sector has expanded the special administration regime and there are further changes on the horizon

Next month marks the hotly anticipated sanction hearing for the Thames Water restructuring plan. We take this opportunity to look back at the key legislative changes made last year, as well as those earmarked for the future.

2024 legislative changes

New legislation was introduced last year to amend the special administration regime for the water sector.

The key changes to the existing regime were as follows:

We examine the findings of the High Court’s decisions and discuss the lessons which directors of distressed businesses should take from them

The collapse of BHS in April 2016 remains one of the most extraordinary corporate failures in recent memory. Eight years on from the commencement of insolvency proceedings, and following a lengthy trial, the High Court has issued an expansive judgment on claims brought by the joint liquidators of four companies in the group against two former directors.

Factual background

The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois issued a noteworthy opinion for those whose work involves real estate mortgage conduit trusts (REMIC trusts) or utilization of the Bankruptcy Code’s “safe harbor” provisions. In In re MCK Millennium Ctr. Parking, LLC,¹ Bankruptcy Judge Jacqueline P.

Bankruptcy Judge Christopher S. Sontchi recently ruled in the Energy Future Holdings case¹ that the debtor will not be required to pay the $431 million “make whole” demanded by bondholders upon the debtor’s early payment of the bonds.²

In what may become viewed as the de facto standard for selling customer information in bankruptcies, a Delaware bankruptcy court approved, on May 20, 2015, a multi-party agreement that would substantially limit RadioShack’s ability to sell 117 million customer records.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wellness International Network Ltd. v. Sharif confirms the long-held and common sense belief that “knowing and voluntary consent” is the key to the exercise of judicial authority by a bankruptcy court judge.1 In short, the Supreme Court held that a litigant in a bankruptcy court can consent—expressly or impliedly through waiver—to the bankruptcy court’s final adjudication of claims that the bankruptcy court otherwise lacks constitutional authority to finally decide.

On May 6, 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether so-called“Deprizio waivers,”¹ where an insider guarantor waives indemnification rights against a debtor, can insulate the guarantor from preference liability arising from payments made by the obligor to the lender. The Ninth Circuit held that if such a waiver is made legitimately—not merely to avoid preference liability—then the guarantor is not a “creditor” and cannot be subject to preference liability.

In In re Filene’s Basement, LLC,¹ the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware considered the rejection damages a landlord claimant was entitled to pursuant to Section 502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code after the debtor rejected its lease as part of its reorganization plan.

Bankruptcy courts appear to be increasingly sending state law claims to the district court for final review, as illustrated by a recent decision from the bankruptcy court for the Southern District of Texas. In Gomez v. Lone Star National Bank (In re Saenz), Jose Gomez financed his acquisition of a restaurant from Humberto Saenz. When the restaurant failed, Gomez sued his lender and Saenz on various claims, but Saenz filed for bankruptcy protection. The lender then moved for summary judgment against Gomez’s claims for common-law fraud and negligence.