Conyers were instructed by Silver Base Group Holdings Limited (“Silver Base”) in relation to a successful application for the appointment of “light-touch” provisional liquidators for restructuring purposes before the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands.

Introduction

In the recent judgment of In the Matter of Margara Shipping Limited (the “Margara Decision”)1 the Cayman Islands Grand Court provided some useful guidance on the basis on which a company can be restored to the Register of Companies (the “Register”) and subsequently wound up pursuant to section 159 of the Companies Act (2021 Revision) (the “Companies Act”) and the Grand Court Rules (2022 Consolidation) (“GCR”), Order 102, Rule 18.

The Legal Basis to Restore and Wind Up A Company

In the recent decision of Evergreen International Holdings Limited, delivered on 11 January 2022, the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands made an order for the immediate winding up of a company notwithstanding the company’s cross-applications for an adjournment of the winding up petition and the appointment of “light-touch” provisional liquidators for restructuring purposes. The Court dismissed the company’s cross-applications on the basis that there was no credible evidence which supported the company’s assertion that a viable restructuring was imminent. 

When entertaining a jurisdictional challenge to wind-up a foreign company with no place of business in Hong Kong, is it a material concern that alternative remedies for unfair prejudice are available at the company’s place of incorporation but not in Hong Kong (“Question”)?

In the recent decision of Aurora Funds Management Limited et al -v- Torchlight GP Limited1 the Cayman Islands Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal brought in respect of an order made by McMillan J in the Grand Court validating certain payments made by Torchlight GP Limited (the "General Partner") in accordance with Section 99 of the Companies Law.

Background

The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois issued a noteworthy opinion for those whose work involves real estate mortgage conduit trusts (REMIC trusts) or utilization of the Bankruptcy Code’s “safe harbor” provisions. In In re MCK Millennium Ctr. Parking, LLC,¹ Bankruptcy Judge Jacqueline P.

Bankruptcy Judge Christopher S. Sontchi recently ruled in the Energy Future Holdings case¹ that the debtor will not be required to pay the $431 million “make whole” demanded by bondholders upon the debtor’s early payment of the bonds.²

In what may become viewed as the de facto standard for selling customer information in bankruptcies, a Delaware bankruptcy court approved, on May 20, 2015, a multi-party agreement that would substantially limit RadioShack’s ability to sell 117 million customer records.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wellness International Network Ltd. v. Sharif confirms the long-held and common sense belief that “knowing and voluntary consent” is the key to the exercise of judicial authority by a bankruptcy court judge.1 In short, the Supreme Court held that a litigant in a bankruptcy court can consent—expressly or impliedly through waiver—to the bankruptcy court’s final adjudication of claims that the bankruptcy court otherwise lacks constitutional authority to finally decide.

On May 6, 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether so-called“Deprizio waivers,”¹ where an insider guarantor waives indemnification rights against a debtor, can insulate the guarantor from preference liability arising from payments made by the obligor to the lender. The Ninth Circuit held that if such a waiver is made legitimately—not merely to avoid preference liability—then the guarantor is not a “creditor” and cannot be subject to preference liability.