In ancient Greek folklore a phoenix was a bird which cyclically regenerated or was otherwise reborn again. It’s a nice idea and most of you will be forgiven for thinking that the phenomenon could never happen. However, if we substitute for a “bird” a “limited company” then the concept is almost one of legal abuse. This is because a phoenix company, in Scotland at least, is one which has ceased to trade or may have been struck off the company register due to, for example, a failure to lodge accounts. There will have been no formal winding up process.

The Privy Council's recent judgment in Weavering^[1]upheld the decisions of the Cayman Islands Grand Court and Court of Appeal that payments made to redeemed investors immediately prior to the fund's liquidation were preference payments under section 145(1) of the Companies Law (2018 Revision) (Law), and must be repaid.

RE Z III Trust [2019] JRC 069

The Royal Court of Jersey has determined that the preferred course to follow when winding up an insolvent trust is for the existing trustee to apply a formal winding up procedure under the Court's supervision. Key features of this procedure would be (i) a moratorium on legal claims; (ii) the trustee should advertise for claims on the trust assets; and (iii) the trustee should require creditors to prove their claims before distributing the assets.

The Z Trusts litigation

The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois issued a noteworthy opinion for those whose work involves real estate mortgage conduit trusts (REMIC trusts) or utilization of the Bankruptcy Code’s “safe harbor” provisions. In In re MCK Millennium Ctr. Parking, LLC,¹ Bankruptcy Judge Jacqueline P.

Bankruptcy Judge Christopher S. Sontchi recently ruled in the Energy Future Holdings case¹ that the debtor will not be required to pay the $431 million “make whole” demanded by bondholders upon the debtor’s early payment of the bonds.²

In what may become viewed as the de facto standard for selling customer information in bankruptcies, a Delaware bankruptcy court approved, on May 20, 2015, a multi-party agreement that would substantially limit RadioShack’s ability to sell 117 million customer records.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wellness International Network Ltd. v. Sharif confirms the long-held and common sense belief that “knowing and voluntary consent” is the key to the exercise of judicial authority by a bankruptcy court judge.1 In short, the Supreme Court held that a litigant in a bankruptcy court can consent—expressly or impliedly through waiver—to the bankruptcy court’s final adjudication of claims that the bankruptcy court otherwise lacks constitutional authority to finally decide.

On May 6, 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether so-called“Deprizio waivers,”¹ where an insider guarantor waives indemnification rights against a debtor, can insulate the guarantor from preference liability arising from payments made by the obligor to the lender. The Ninth Circuit held that if such a waiver is made legitimately—not merely to avoid preference liability—then the guarantor is not a “creditor” and cannot be subject to preference liability.

In In re Filene’s Basement, LLC,¹ the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware considered the rejection damages a landlord claimant was entitled to pursuant to Section 502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code after the debtor rejected its lease as part of its reorganization plan.

The recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in Jetivia S.A. and Another v Bilta (UK) Limited (in liquidation) and Ors should make it easier to pursue claims against rogue directors. The Supreme Court held that, in instances where a company has suffered as a result of the unlawful behaviour of its directors, that behaviour cannot be attributed to the company to disallow the company, or its liquidators, from raising claims against directors for breach of their duties.

Background