In the recent case of HMRC v Munir & Others[1], HMRC successfully applied to the Court for committal of three company officers for contempt of court where an order appointing a provisional liquidator was knowingly breached.

 Background

In what may become viewed as the de facto standard for selling customer information in bankruptcies, a Delaware bankruptcy court approved, on May 20, 2015, a multi-party agreement that would substantially limit RadioShack’s ability to sell 117 million customer records.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wellness International Network Ltd. v. Sharif confirms the long-held and common sense belief that “knowing and voluntary consent” is the key to the exercise of judicial authority by a bankruptcy court judge.1 In short, the Supreme Court held that a litigant in a bankruptcy court can consent—expressly or impliedly through waiver—to the bankruptcy court’s final adjudication of claims that the bankruptcy court otherwise lacks constitutional authority to finally decide.

On May 6, 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether so-called“Deprizio waivers,”¹ where an insider guarantor waives indemnification rights against a debtor, can insulate the guarantor from preference liability arising from payments made by the obligor to the lender. The Ninth Circuit held that if such a waiver is made legitimately—not merely to avoid preference liability—then the guarantor is not a “creditor” and cannot be subject to preference liability.

ADVISORY | DISPUTES | TRANSACTIONS Financial Litigation roundup Spring 2015 Welcome to the latest edition of our Financial Litigation roundup. In this edition, we consider recent judgments and ongoing cases from the banking and financial world in the UK and Asia, as well as regulatory developments across those jurisdictions. English judgments SPL Private Finance (PF1) IC Limited and others v Arch Financial Products LLP and others; SPL Private Finance (PF2) IC Ltd and other v Robin Farrell. more> McWilliam v Norton Finance (UK) Ltd (in liquidation).

Removal of requirement for sanction

Previously under section 165 IA 86, liquidators in a voluntary winding up would have to seek sanction of the company (in members’ voluntary liquidation) or of the court or liquidation committee (in creditors’ voluntary liquidation) in order to exercise their powers to pay debts, compromise claims etc. SBEEA removes this requirement so that liquidators can exercise those powers freely. This will aid expeditious winding up of companies. Equivalent provisions have also been put into place for trustees in bankruptcy.

In In re Filene’s Basement, LLC,¹ the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware considered the rejection damages a landlord claimant was entitled to pursuant to Section 502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code after the debtor rejected its lease as part of its reorganization plan.

In April 2013, the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO) came into force, making the success fee applied to a Conditional Fee Arrangement (CFA), and the After the Event (ATE) insurance premiums, irrecoverable by a successful party to litigation proceedings.  However, under article 4 of LAPSO, there is an "insolvency exemption" making these costs recoverable by an insolvency practitioner.

Bankruptcy courts appear to be increasingly sending state law claims to the district court for final review, as illustrated by a recent decision from the bankruptcy court for the Southern District of Texas. In Gomez v. Lone Star National Bank (In re Saenz), Jose Gomez financed his acquisition of a restaurant from Humberto Saenz. When the restaurant failed, Gomez sued his lender and Saenz on various claims, but Saenz filed for bankruptcy protection. The lender then moved for summary judgment against Gomez’s claims for common-law fraud and negligence.

On March 10, 2015, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama issued a memorandum decision in the case of Harrelson v. DSS, Inc. (No. 14-mc-03675), declining to withdraw the reference from the bankruptcy court and holding that the existence of an arbitration agreement and a class action waiver in that arbitration agreement did not require substantial consideration of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).

Facts