In a challenging economy bankruptcy increasingly stands accused of constituting a mechanism for debtors to escape their responsibilities at their creditors' expense. It understandably remains a live debate as to whether a bankrupt should be afforded the means of a protected pot of money for his future use while his creditors are left unrecompensed for their loss. The debate is not new, but the balance has perhaps shifted in a climate where creditor losses are felt particularly keenly.

In what may become viewed as the de facto standard for selling customer information in bankruptcies, a Delaware bankruptcy court approved, on May 20, 2015, a multi-party agreement that would substantially limit RadioShack’s ability to sell 117 million customer records.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wellness International Network Ltd. v. Sharif confirms the long-held and common sense belief that “knowing and voluntary consent” is the key to the exercise of judicial authority by a bankruptcy court judge.1 In short, the Supreme Court held that a litigant in a bankruptcy court can consent—expressly or impliedly through waiver—to the bankruptcy court’s final adjudication of claims that the bankruptcy court otherwise lacks constitutional authority to finally decide.

On May 6, 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether so-called“Deprizio waivers,”¹ where an insider guarantor waives indemnification rights against a debtor, can insulate the guarantor from preference liability arising from payments made by the obligor to the lender. The Ninth Circuit held that if such a waiver is made legitimately—not merely to avoid preference liability—then the guarantor is not a “creditor” and cannot be subject to preference liability.

In In re Filene’s Basement, LLC,¹ the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware considered the rejection damages a landlord claimant was entitled to pursuant to Section 502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code after the debtor rejected its lease as part of its reorganization plan.

The BIS and Scottish Affairs Commons Select Committees have published a joint report recommending greater protection for workers when a business is faced with insolvency. The report was issued in response to the recent collapse of City Link (The impact of the closure of City Link on Employment).

Bankruptcy courts appear to be increasingly sending state law claims to the district court for final review, as illustrated by a recent decision from the bankruptcy court for the Southern District of Texas. In Gomez v. Lone Star National Bank (In re Saenz), Jose Gomez financed his acquisition of a restaurant from Humberto Saenz. When the restaurant failed, Gomez sued his lender and Saenz on various claims, but Saenz filed for bankruptcy protection. The lender then moved for summary judgment against Gomez’s claims for common-law fraud and negligence.

In Re Mark Irwin Forstater [2015] BPIR, the petitioning creditor presented a bankruptcy petition against the debtor, Mr Forstater, on 13 June 2014. It first came before the court on 30 July 2014, when it was adjourned to allow the  debtor to take legal advice. At the adjourned hearing on 12 August 2014, the debtor indicated that he intended to pursue an IVA. The hearing was adjourned again to await the outcome of a meeting of creditors. The meeting of creditors was itself adjourned for 14 days from 1 September 2014 to 15 September 2014.

Income payments orders (IPOs) are an essential tool for the trustee in bankruptcy in realising a bankrupt’s assets. Until recently, it had been assumed that, absent circumstances akin to fraud, a trustee in bankruptcy could not touch a bankrupt’s undrawn pension. However, in Raithatha v Williamson, the court decided that an income payments order may be made where the bankrupt has an entitlement to elect to draw a pension but has not exercised it at the time of the application. 

Drawn versus undrawn

On March 10, 2015, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama issued a memorandum decision in the case of Harrelson v. DSS, Inc. (No. 14-mc-03675), declining to withdraw the reference from the bankruptcy court and holding that the existence of an arbitration agreement and a class action waiver in that arbitration agreement did not require substantial consideration of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).

Facts