Credit agreements by their terms commonly bar the borrower from seeking punitive, indirect, special or consequential damages for a breach of the agreement by lenders and their affiliates. The clauses, as enforced, prevent a borrower from obtaining damages for harm that may be suffered by the borrower's business if the lender wrongfully declines to fund. The clauses prevent lenders from exposure to open-ended damages claims if the lenders refuse to lend to a borrower, including damages that are the direct and indirect result of the failure to lend.

Introduction – Distressed Issuers and Borrowers

On January 15, 2016, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the “Third Circuit”) held in In re Trump Entertainment Resorts that section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a debtor to reject an expired collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”).

In Quadrant Structured Products Company, Ltd. v. Vertin (Oct. 20, 2015), the Delaware Court of Chancery, in a post-trial decision, rejected Quadrant’s challenges to transactions by Athilon Capital Corp., with Athilon’s sole stockholder (private equity firm Merced), after Athilon had returned to solvency following a long period of insolvency. Merced held all of Athilon’s equity and all of its junior notes; and both Quadrant and Merced held the company’s publicly traded senior notes.

The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois issued a noteworthy opinion for those whose work involves real estate mortgage conduit trusts (REMIC trusts) or utilization of the Bankruptcy Code’s “safe harbor” provisions. In In re MCK Millennium Ctr. Parking, LLC,¹ Bankruptcy Judge Jacqueline P.

Bankruptcy Judge Christopher S. Sontchi recently ruled in the Energy Future Holdings case¹ that the debtor will not be required to pay the $431 million “make whole” demanded by bondholders upon the debtor’s early payment of the bonds.²

On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the “Third Circuit”) affirmed the order of the United States District Court for the District of Delaware in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Group/Business Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.) approving a settlement and dismissal of a chapter 11 case by way of a “structured dismissal.” A structured dismissal is, simply, the dismissal of the bankruptcy case preceded by other orders, such as an order approving a settlement or granting releases, which survive dismissal of the case.

To Our Clients and Friends Memorandum friedfrank.com Copyright © 2015 Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP 06/04/15 A Delaware Limited Liability Partnership 1 The Supreme Court Rules That Bankruptcy Judges May Adjudicate Stern Claims with the Parties’ Knowing and Voluntary Consent On May 26, 2015, the Supreme Court in Wellness International Network v.

In what may become viewed as the de facto standard for selling customer information in bankruptcies, a Delaware bankruptcy court approved, on May 20, 2015, a multi-party agreement that would substantially limit RadioShack’s ability to sell 117 million customer records.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wellness International Network Ltd. v. Sharif confirms the long-held and common sense belief that “knowing and voluntary consent” is the key to the exercise of judicial authority by a bankruptcy court judge.1 In short, the Supreme Court held that a litigant in a bankruptcy court can consent—expressly or impliedly through waiver—to the bankruptcy court’s final adjudication of claims that the bankruptcy court otherwise lacks constitutional authority to finally decide.