Compensation for bankruptcy professionals employed in bankruptcy cases is governed by Section 330 of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 330(a)(1) of the code provides, in pertinent part, that "the court may award to ... a professional person employed under Section 327 or 1103—(A) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered." Professionals whose employment is approved by the bankruptcy court consequently must file fee applications, to be reviewed and approved by the court for work performed in the bankruptcy case.

On Jan. 21, in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Motors Liquidation v. JPMorgan Chase Bank (In re Motors Liquidation), No. 13-2187, (2d Cir. Jan. 21, 2015), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed whether a UCC-3 termination statement, which was improperly filed as part of the repayment of an unrelated loan, may be considered effective to terminate the security interest in question, even where none of the parties intended that result.

The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois issued a noteworthy opinion for those whose work involves real estate mortgage conduit trusts (REMIC trusts) or utilization of the Bankruptcy Code’s “safe harbor” provisions. In In re MCK Millennium Ctr. Parking, LLC,¹ Bankruptcy Judge Jacqueline P.

Bankruptcy Judge Christopher S. Sontchi recently ruled in the Energy Future Holdings case¹ that the debtor will not be required to pay the $431 million “make whole” demanded by bondholders upon the debtor’s early payment of the bonds.²

Section 303 of the Bankruptcy Code provides creditors with a mechanism to force a recalcitrant debtor into bankruptcy through the filing of an involuntary petition for relief. Pursuant to this section, an involuntary bankruptcy case may be commenced only under Chapter 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, and may only be brought against a person otherwise qualified to file a voluntary petition. Where the purported debtor has fewer than 12 creditors, the involuntary petition need only be filed by a single creditor.

In what may become viewed as the de facto standard for selling customer information in bankruptcies, a Delaware bankruptcy court approved, on May 20, 2015, a multi-party agreement that would substantially limit RadioShack’s ability to sell 117 million customer records.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wellness International Network Ltd. v. Sharif confirms the long-held and common sense belief that “knowing and voluntary consent” is the key to the exercise of judicial authority by a bankruptcy court judge.1 In short, the Supreme Court held that a litigant in a bankruptcy court can consent—expressly or impliedly through waiver—to the bankruptcy court’s final adjudication of claims that the bankruptcy court otherwise lacks constitutional authority to finally decide.

On May 6, 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether so-called“Deprizio waivers,”¹ where an insider guarantor waives indemnification rights against a debtor, can insulate the guarantor from preference liability arising from payments made by the obligor to the lender. The Ninth Circuit held that if such a waiver is made legitimately—not merely to avoid preference liability—then the guarantor is not a “creditor” and cannot be subject to preference liability.

The world may end in fire and ice but, at least for now, it will not end in the bankruptcy court.[1]

In In re Filene’s Basement, LLC,¹ the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware considered the rejection damages a landlord claimant was entitled to pursuant to Section 502(b)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code after the debtor rejected its lease as part of its reorganization plan.