In In re East End Development, LLC, 2013 WL 1820182 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Apr.
The Ninth Circuit has joined the majority of Circuit Courts in holding that bankruptcy courts have the authority to recharacterize alleged debts as equity. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creds. v. Hancock Park Capital II, L.P. (In re Fitness Holdings Int’l, Inc.), No. 11-56677, --- F.3d ----, 2013 WL 1800000 (9th Cir. April 30, 2013). In doing so, the appellate court has explicitly reversed the contrary precedent of In re Pacific Express, Inc., 69 B.R. 112, 115 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986).
In re Big M, Inc., No. 13-10233 (DHS), 2013 WL 1681489 (Bankr. D.N.J. April 17, 2013). In Big M, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey (the “Bankruptcy Court”) held that the debtor’s privilege did not pass to the creditors’ committee, even though the creditors’ committee obtained authority to investigate certain of the debtor’s causes of action, because the committee was acting as a fiduciary to creditors as opposed to the debtor’s estate.
Few courts have construed the meaning of “repurchase agreement” as used in the Bankruptcy Code, so the recent HomeBanc1 case out of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware is a must-read for “repo” counterparties. The principal issue in HomeBanc was whether several zero purchase price repo transactions under the parties’ contract for the sale and repurchase of mortgage-backed securities fell within the definition of a “repurchase agreement” in Section 101(47) of the Bankruptcy Code.
In a ruling on February 28, 2013, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois reversed the February 29, 2012 order of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Illinois allowing a bankruptcy trustee to avoid an Illinois mortgage as to unsecured creditors for lack of “constructive notice” because the mortgage did not expressly state the maturity date of and interest rate on the underlying debt (In Re Crane, Case 12-2146, U.S. Dist. Ct., C.D. IL, February 28, 2013).
The Upstream C Reorganization
In the late 20th century, the IRS made a combination of unrelated decisions resulting in a proliferation of upstream C reorganizations. First was the repeal of the Bausch & Lomb rule, meaning that the equity held by a parent corporation in its subsidiary could count as continuity of interest, thus allowing the liquidation of a subsidiary to be treated as an upstream C reorganization. Second, the invention of the check-the-box regulations made subsidiary liquidations (and hence upstream reorganizations) so much easier.
Earlier this year we reported on a Michigan trial court opinion, issued by Judge Edward R. Post of the Ottawa County Circuit Court in First Financial Bank, N.A. v. Scott T. Bosgraaf, et al., Case No. 11-02488 (click here to read), concluding that a court-appointed receiver has the power to sell mortgaged commercial real property free and clear of statutory mortgage foreclosure redemption rights.
LTR 201240017 is the world’s longest letter ruling, 111 pages in PDF format. Not surprisingly, it is a Section 355 ruling. It was issued three-and-a-half months after the original submission, with those dates bridging Christmas and New Year’s Day. There were seven additional submissions from the taxpayer in the interim. The release of the ruling was delayed for a couple of months.
Disgruntled debtors seeking to evade their obligations by filing fraudulent liens soon face new threats under Illinois law. On July 25, 2012, Governor Patrick Quinn approved and signed Senate Bill 1692, which is intended to provide additional remedies for wrongfully filed UCC liens.5 Senate Bill 1692 becomes effective January 1, 2013 and will be incorporated into section nine of the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code.
In 2012, several judicial opinions have reminded directors, officers and “responsible persons” that personal liability may be imposed for business taxes. See our alert from June 20, 2012. Responsible persons are reminded again that not only will authorities impose liability for unpaid taxes of a business on individuals but that the imposition of such taxes may not be dischargeable in bankruptcy.