In Lewis Brothers Bakeries, Inc. and Chicago Baking Co. v. Interstate Brands Corp. (2014 WL 2535294 (8th Cir. June 6, 2014)), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that a perpetual, royalty-free, assignable, transferable, exclusive trademark license granted in connection with a substantially consummated asset purchase agreement was not an executory contract that could be assumed or rejected by the licensor-debtor in bankruptcy.

As bankruptcy practitioners will recall, the Supreme Court held in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S., 131 S.Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011) that bankruptcy courts, as non-Article III courts, “lack[] the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim,” even though Congress had classified these types of proceedings as core – and thus authorized federal bankruptcy courts to hear and decide them.

In 2014, the Chilean Legislature enacted legislation that substantially overhauls its prior insolvency law, liberalizing that law as it pertains to business insolvency cases commenced in Chile. As explained below, this new law incorporates a number of provisions that permit the reorganization of financially troubled businesses.

A federal district court has ruled that a distressed debt fund is not a “financial institution” for purposes of the assignment provisions of a loan agreement.

Background

A lingering misperception among American businesspersons and some commercial lawyers is that it is a fool’s errand to commence an insolvency case seeking reorganization in a European nation because those national laws prescribe liquidation rather than rehabilitation. These business leaders often dismiss out-of-hand insolvency relief on the continent for a troubled European subsidiary and elect to wind up the company’s affairs outside the judicial system.

A & F Enterprises, Inc. v. IHOP Franchising LLC (In re A & F Enterprises, Inc.), 2014 WL 494857 (7th Cir. 2014)

On February 4, 2014, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey in In re Surma, 2014 WL 413572 (Bankr. D.N.J. Feb. 4, 2014), held that rents were not property of the debtor’s bankruptcy estate because they were subject to an absolute and unconditional assignment of rents in favor of the secured lender. As a result, the court concluded that the debtor may not, through his Chapter 11 plan of reorganization, use or allocate rents.

Background

In In reLehman Brothers Inc., two creditors recently made an unsuccessful attempt to infuse Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code with ambiguity and avoid the subordination of their claims.  In re Lehman Brothers, Inc., 2014 WL 288571 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently limited the ability of a secured creditor to credit bid for substantially all of the debtors’ assets because (i) the credit bid would chill, or even freeze, the bidding process, (ii) the proposed expedited private sale pursuant to a credit bid would be inconsistent with notions of fairness in the bankruptcy process, and (iii) the amount of the secured claim was uncertain. In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., Case No. 13-13087 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 17, 2014).

Section 1111(b) of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) is one of its least understood provisions, primarily due to its somewhat opaque language. This Code subsection is divided into two distinct but related parts. The first part, section 1111(b)(1), provides that a nonrecourse secured claim in a Chapter 11 case will be treated “as if such holder had recourse against the debtor on account of such claim, whether or not such holder has such recourse” subject to two exceptions.