The recent case of F Options Ltd v Prestwood Properties Ltd concerned the setting aside of a transaction as a preference under section 239 of the Insolvency Act 1986.

A preference arises when a company's creditor is put in a better position than they would otherwise have been in the event of the company's insolvency. Transactions may be a preference whether or not the parties are connected, but where it can be shown that there is a connection within section 249 of the Insolvency Act 1986, two important advantages are gained:

The law allows any person to be treated as a director even though that person has not been formally appointed as a director. Such directors are known as de-facto directors. By contrast, a de jure director is a person who has been validly appointed as a director.

The recent case of Re Snelling House Ltd (In Liquidation) [2012] EWHC 440 (Ch) serves as a useful reminder to consider possible claims against de-facto directors who may be acting under the wrong impression that they are beyond reprehension.

The facts

The long awaited judgment in The Commissioners for her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v. Football League Limited, on the so called “football creditors’ rule” (the “Rule”) has been given.

This article only concerns itself with the issue of whether the Rule was or was not considered void on the grounds that it was contrary to the pari passu principle and the anti-deprivation rule and not on the fairness of the Rule itself.

On May 24, 2012, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (District Court) issued an opinion with significant ramifications for law firms seeking to hire former partners from bankrupt law firms. At issue was whether, under New York partnership law, the law firms that hired former partners of Coudert Brothers LLP (Coudert), a dissolved and bankrupt law partnership, must account for profits that the former Coudert partners earned while completing work on open client matters they took with them from Coudert.

Avoidance Preferences Generally

As many creditors have experienced firsthand, the bankruptcy code allows a debtor, trustee or other estate representative to recover certain payments made within 90 days of the date a bankruptcy case was filed.

The rules applying to the filing of proofs of claim were overhauled substantially in 2011 and require parties filing proofs of claim in bankruptcy proceedings to take heed, especially where the debtor is a natural person (an individual). 

BESTrustees v Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander [2012] EWHC 629 (Ch) (High Court Chancery Division 16 March 2012)

Background

It is looking increasingly likely that 2012 will be another difficult year for the automotive sector, leading to a decline, not only in vehicle sales, but also in goods and services supplied to the sector. As a result, businesses may experience cash flow problems and increased creditor pressure to pay invoices.

We previously reported on Raithatha v Williamson (4 April 2012) where the High Court held that a bankrupt’s right to draw a pension was subject to an income payments order (“IPO”) even if the individual had yet to draw his pension. This judgment represented a significant departure from previous practice under the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 which protected future pension rights from IPOs and distinguished them from pensions in payment. It also effectively allowed a trustee in bankruptcy to compel a bankrupt to draw pension against his wishes.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has lifted the automatic stay in bankruptcy to permit D&O and E&O insurers to advance or reimburse insured directors,’ officers’ and employees’ reasonable defense costs incurred in underlying litigation arising out of the insured company’s collapse.  In re MF Global Holdings Ltd., et al., No. 11-15059 (MG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2012)