In a closely-watched case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently affirmed the decision of the Delaware District Court, holding that bankruptcy claims are subject to disallowance under section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code despite their subsequent sale to a third-party. In In re KB Toys, Inc., No. 13-1197 (3d Cir. Nov.

In connection with the bankruptcy of a bank holding company (the “Bank Holdco”) and its operating bank subsidiary (the “Bank”), there are often different classes of creditors competing for one tax refund.

This decision is a testament to the flexibility of schemes of arrangement in Australia as a means of effecting settlements with a company’s creditors as well as third parties such as the company’s insurers. The Federal Court also demonstrated its propensity to take a liberal interpretation of what constitutes a “compromise or arrangement” to enliven its jurisdiction to convene a meeting of creditors for the purpose of considering a proposed scheme of arrangement.

From 15 August 2013, the Insolvency & Trustee Service Australia (ITSA) will now be known as the Australian Financial Security Authority (AFSA). The name change is thought to better capture the breadth of the services administered by the authority, but the services remain the same, namely, the administration and regulation of Australia’s personal insolvency system and the administration of the Personal Property Securities Register.

While newly discovered Element 115 (or “ununpentium” as scientists are temporarily calling it) appears to have vanished quickly in a flash of radiation in front of the eyes of Swedish scientists, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Oklahoma confirmed that make-whole is a well-established stable compound and here to stay.

While the arrival of His Royal Highness Prince George Alexander Louis of Cambridge has dominated the British (and the world) headlines this week, the U.K. Supreme Court delivered its own long awaited bundle of joy earlier today. In the latest decision in the laborious Nortel and Lehman litigations, the U.K. Supreme Court reversed a lower court decision and held that pension claims should not be treated as priority claims and, instead, they should rank equally with general unsecured claims.

The Federal Court found that where a trust deed provides for the cessation of a corporate trustee upon the appointment of an administrator or upon a resolution for its liquidation (and there is no replacement trustee appointed), the corporate trustee retains its right of indemnity and continues as bare trustee but does not have the power to sell the trust assets.  However, the Court was persuaded to grant relief to the liquidators of the trustee (who had sold trust assets) on the basis they had not been advised by their solicitors of the disqualification clause and they com

Thanks to Anna Nicole Smith and the June 2011 landmark Supreme Court decision in Stern v. Marshall, there are seemingly more questions regarding a bankruptcy judge’s authority to enter final orders (or even proposed orders) than ever before. Those unanswered questions have created considerable uncertainty and, not surprisingly, lengthier and costlier litigation in bankruptcy. Thankfully, the Supremes decided on June 24, 2013 that they will address two of the many questions left unanswered by Stern.

Navigating the most recent leg in the Quebecor regatta, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court and ruled that prepetition transfers made in connection with a securities contract may qualify for safe harbor from avoidance actions under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code—even if the transferee is a mere “conduit” or “intermediary” financial institution. In re Quebecor World (USA) Inc. (Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Quebecor World (USA) Inc. v. American United Life Insurance Co.), No. 12-4270-bk (2d Cir. June 10, 2013).

The Delaware Bankruptcy Court recently held that a third amendment to a lease agreement entered into for the purpose of leasing a second building could not be severed from the original lease agreement; and the debtor was not allowed to reject the lease on that second building under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.