As the wave of litigation spawned by the 2008 financial crisis begins to ebb, insurance-coverage litigation arising out of the credit crisis continues unabated. Financial institutions have successfully pursued insurance coverage for many credit-crisis claims under directors and officers (D&O) and errors and omissions (E&O) policies that they purchased to protect themselves against wrongful-act claims brought by their customers, but in response, some insurers continue to raise inapplicable exclusions in an attempt to diminish or limit coverage for their policyholders.

The inclusion of pre-bankruptcy waivers in “standard issue” credit documents has generated a host of litigation in bankruptcy cases about the enforceability of such provisions.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (the “Court”) issued an opinion limiting the ability of a “loan to own” secured creditor to credit bid at an auction for the sale of substantially all of the debtors’ assets.¹ The Court focused on the fact that the creditor’s conduct interfered with the sale process and was motivated by its desire to “own the Debtors’ business” rather than to have its d

On January 17, 2014, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the “Bankruptcy Court”) entered an order in the Fisker Automotive (“Fisker”) chapter 11 bankruptcy cases limiting the ability of Fisker’s secured lender, Hybrid Tech Holdings, LLC (“Hybrid”), to credit bid at an auction for the sale of substantially all of Fisker’s assets.¹ Hybrid immediately sought an appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s

In a closely-watched case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently affirmed the decision of the Delaware District Court, holding that bankruptcy claims are subject to disallowance under section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code despite their subsequent sale to a third-party. In In re KB Toys, Inc., No. 13-1197 (3d Cir. Nov.

In connection with the bankruptcy of a bank holding company (the “Bank Holdco”) and its operating bank subsidiary (the “Bank”), there are often different classes of creditors competing for one tax refund.

While newly discovered Element 115 (or “ununpentium” as scientists are temporarily calling it) appears to have vanished quickly in a flash of radiation in front of the eyes of Swedish scientists, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Oklahoma confirmed that make-whole is a well-established stable compound and here to stay.

While the arrival of His Royal Highness Prince George Alexander Louis of Cambridge has dominated the British (and the world) headlines this week, the U.K. Supreme Court delivered its own long awaited bundle of joy earlier today. In the latest decision in the laborious Nortel and Lehman litigations, the U.K. Supreme Court reversed a lower court decision and held that pension claims should not be treated as priority claims and, instead, they should rank equally with general unsecured claims.

Thanks to Anna Nicole Smith and the June 2011 landmark Supreme Court decision in Stern v. Marshall, there are seemingly more questions regarding a bankruptcy judge’s authority to enter final orders (or even proposed orders) than ever before. Those unanswered questions have created considerable uncertainty and, not surprisingly, lengthier and costlier litigation in bankruptcy. Thankfully, the Supremes decided on June 24, 2013 that they will address two of the many questions left unanswered by Stern.

Navigating the most recent leg in the Quebecor regatta, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court and ruled that prepetition transfers made in connection with a securities contract may qualify for safe harbor from avoidance actions under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code—even if the transferee is a mere “conduit” or “intermediary” financial institution. In re Quebecor World (USA) Inc. (Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Quebecor World (USA) Inc. v. American United Life Insurance Co.), No. 12-4270-bk (2d Cir. June 10, 2013).