In an action against a Florida consumer plaintiffs’ firm that also functions as consumer bankruptcy debtors’ counsel, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently held that a bankruptcy attorney violates section 526(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code if he instructs a client to pay his legal fees using a credit card.

In so ruling, the Court held that there is no requirement under the statute that the advice be given for an invalid purpose designed to manipulate the bankruptcy process.

The Supreme Court of Florida recently denied a pro se borrower’s petition to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court, and imposed sanctions against him for filing numerous meritless and inappropriate petitions for relief pertaining to trial court foreclosure proceedings to which he is a defendant.

In so doing, the Supreme Court barred the borrower from filing any future pleadings, motions or requests for relief in the Supreme Court related to his foreclosure proceedings, unless filed in good faith by an attorney in good standing.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held that a completely unsecured lien may be stripped off in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) even though a proof of claim has not been filed.

A copy of the opinion in Edwin Burkhart v. Nancy Spencer Grigsby is available at: Link to Opinion.

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit recently held that the constructive notice provisions of section 1301.401 of the Ohio Revised Code do not limit a bankruptcy trustee’s avoidance powers as a hypothetical judgment lien creditor under section 544(a)(1) of the federal Bankruptcy Code.

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion.

The Circuit Courts of Appeal have split on whether a prepetition transfer made by a debtor is avoidable if the transfer was made through a financial intermediary that was a mere conduit. Today, the Supreme Court unanimously resolved the split by deciding that transfers through “mere conduits” are not protected. This is a major (and adverse) decision for lenders, bondholders and noteholders who receive payments through an intermediary such as a disbursing agent.

Reversing the rulings of both the appellate and the trial courts, the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois recently held that the deadline to file a motion to quash service under the Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law (IMFL) did not run while the foreclosure action was dismissed for want of prosecution.

A copy of the opinion is available at:  Link to Opinion.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar the trial court from considering the plaintiff’s claims because she was not challenging or seeking to set aside an underlying non-judicial mortgage foreclosure proceeding under Colorado law.

Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit remanded to the trial court to determine what effect, if any, the non-judicial proceeding had under the doctrines of issue and claim preclusion.

The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, recently dismissed a mortgagee’s “breach of mortgage contract” action as an impermissible second refiling following prior voluntary dismissals of a 2011 foreclosure complaint and 2013 action for breach of the promissory note based upon the same note and mortgage.

The District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida, Fourth District, recently reversed a trial court’s order denying two borrowers’ request for attorney’s fees and costs on judicial estoppel grounds.

In so ruling, the Fourth DCA held that the trial court improperly relied on a Fifth Circuit case and failed to apply Florida’s judicial estoppel doctrine when it concluded that the borrowers’ failure to disclose their attorney’s fee claim in their Chapter 11 bankruptcy schedules barred the fee claim.

In a previous article, The Eagle and the Bear: Russian Proceedings Recognized Under Chapter 15, we discussed In re Poymanov, in which the Bankruptcy Court (SDNY) recognized a Russian foreign proceeding under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code even though the debtor had only nominal assets in the United States (the “Recognition Order”). The Bankruptcy Court had declined to rule upon recognition whether the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C.