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Given the commonality in today’s marketplace of complex corporate capital structures that employ multiple layers of secured debt, existing and potential creditors need to be increasingly aware of the rights and limitations provided for in subordination or intercreditor agreements. These agreements are often entered into between the existing lender or debt holder and a new lender. They often restrict the actions of subordinated lenders upon the debtor’s filing for bankruptcy protection, including denying their right to vote on the debtor’s plan of reorganization.

Thanks to Anna Nicole Smith and the June 2011 landmark Supreme Court decision in Stern v. Marshall, there are seemingly more questions regarding a bankruptcy judge’s authority to enter final orders (or even proposed orders) than ever before. Those unanswered questions have created considerable uncertainty and, not surprisingly, lengthier and costlier litigation in bankruptcy. Thankfully, the Supremes decided on June 24, 2013 that they will address two of the many questions left unanswered by Stern.

Navigating the most recent leg in the Quebecor regatta, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court and ruled that prepetition transfers made in connection with a securities contract may qualify for safe harbor from avoidance actions under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code—even if the transferee is a mere “conduit” or “intermediary” financial institution. In re Quebecor World (USA) Inc. (Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Quebecor World (USA) Inc. v. American United Life Insurance Co.), No. 12-4270-bk (2d Cir. June 10, 2013).

The Delaware Bankruptcy Court recently held that a third amendment to a lease agreement entered into for the purpose of leasing a second building could not be severed from the original lease agreement; and the debtor was not allowed to reject the lease on that second building under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.

In a recent decision1, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York found the standard for sealing under § 107 of the Bankruptcy Code was not met and declined to seal a settlement agreement, despite requests from the Chapter 7 trustee (the "Trustee") and the counterparties to the settlement agreement to do so. Confidentiality was an essential condition of the settlement. In addition, the United States trustee supported the motion to seal, arguing that the standard for sealing had been met.

It was just an old jalopy legally repossessed by his credit union . . . until he filed a bankruptcy petition and the red lights of the automatic stay started flashing. Smokey pulled the lender over and started issuing citations so be forewarned, put your hazard lights on and drive carefully through the postpetition fog, because this decision is relevant to all secured creditors under all Bankruptcy Code Chapters, not just car lenders under Chapter 13.

The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”) introduced the most comprehensive amendments to United States bankruptcy law in 25 years.

Congress enacted the ordinary course of business defense to the avoidance of preferential transfers to protect recurring, customary transactions in order to encourage the continuation of business with and the extension of credit to a financially distressed customer.

Bankruptcy Code Section 503(b)(9) litigations have sometimes yield "shocking results". There is no pun intended here. This article discusses a recent case where the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana waded into the spine tingling issue of whether electricity is a good that is subject to Section 503(b)(9) administrative priority status.

Large businesses and organizations that self-insure their legally mandated insurance requirements often use “fronting” policies in which the policyholder must reimburse insurers for all losses and expenses paid on the policyholder’s behalf. These policyholders must furnish substantial collateral to secure repayment, typically, enough to pay many years’ worth of actual and anticipated claims. This can amount to hundreds of millions of dollars, and typically exacerbates cash flow and balance sheet problems for policyholders under financial stress.