I have blogged several times about the difficulties of preserving non-qualified plan benefits, particularly when the plan sponsor goes bankrupt. At the time of a bankruptcy, the company's non-qualified plan becomes nothing more than an unfunded promise to pay benefits and participants usually have to get in line with the company's other creditors. The recent decision in Tate v. General Motors LLC (56 EBC 1363, 6th Cir.

While newly discovered Element 115 (or “ununpentium” as scientists are temporarily calling it) appears to have vanished quickly in a flash of radiation in front of the eyes of Swedish scientists, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Oklahoma confirmed that make-whole is a well-established stable compound and here to stay.

While the arrival of His Royal Highness Prince George Alexander Louis of Cambridge has dominated the British (and the world) headlines this week, the U.K. Supreme Court delivered its own long awaited bundle of joy earlier today. In the latest decision in the laborious Nortel and Lehman litigations, the U.K. Supreme Court reversed a lower court decision and held that pension claims should not be treated as priority claims and, instead, they should rank equally with general unsecured claims.

Thanks to Anna Nicole Smith and the June 2011 landmark Supreme Court decision in Stern v. Marshall, there are seemingly more questions regarding a bankruptcy judge’s authority to enter final orders (or even proposed orders) than ever before. Those unanswered questions have created considerable uncertainty and, not surprisingly, lengthier and costlier litigation in bankruptcy. Thankfully, the Supremes decided on June 24, 2013 that they will address two of the many questions left unanswered by Stern.

On June 10th, the FDIC published the final rule establishing the criteria for determining if a company is predominantly engaged in "activities that are financial in nature or incidental thereto" for purposes of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act and therefore subject to the FDIC's orderly liquidation authority.

Navigating the most recent leg in the Quebecor regatta, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court and ruled that prepetition transfers made in connection with a securities contract may qualify for safe harbor from avoidance actions under section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code—even if the transferee is a mere “conduit” or “intermediary” financial institution. In re Quebecor World (USA) Inc. (Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Quebecor World (USA) Inc. v. American United Life Insurance Co.), No. 12-4270-bk (2d Cir. June 10, 2013).

The Delaware Bankruptcy Court recently held that a third amendment to a lease agreement entered into for the purpose of leasing a second building could not be severed from the original lease agreement; and the debtor was not allowed to reject the lease on that second building under section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.

It was just an old jalopy legally repossessed by his credit union . . . until he filed a bankruptcy petition and the red lights of the automatic stay started flashing. Smokey pulled the lender over and started issuing citations so be forewarned, put your hazard lights on and drive carefully through the postpetition fog, because this decision is relevant to all secured creditors under all Bankruptcy Code Chapters, not just car lenders under Chapter 13.

In Sposato v. First Mariner Bank, 2013 WL 1308582 (D. Md.